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I. INTRODUCTION

A

ccountability is the “new black” of international governance.1
Fears of cooptation of governance by non-state, and therefore in
some scholars’ minds, non-legitimate, actors pervades the literature on
accountability.2 This critique of non-governmental organizations’
(NGOs) participation in international governance regimes generally
starts with the question: “Who elected the NGOs?”3 This is a fair question to raise, but one which does not address the whole picture or normatively invalidate NGO participation in all circumstances.
The current debate and literature over-emphasizes democratic accountability to the possible detriment of other available means of ensuring accountability in governance regimes.4 This Article posits the emphasis on
elements such as elections and representativeness of governance actors
as lone indicators of accountability is insufficient to justify participation
1. Governance is used throughout this Article in the narrow sense of governance
with governmental involvement. See generally GOVERNANCE WITHOUT GOVERNMENT:
ORDER AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS (Ernst-Otto Czempiel & James Rosenau eds.,
1992) (discussing the broadening concept of governance beyond governments). It is
therefore “a mode of governing that is distinct from the hierarchical control model characterizing the interventionist state. Governance is the type of regulation typical of the
cooperative state, where state and non-state actors participate in mixed public/private
policy networks.” Renate Mayntz, Common Goods and Governance, in COMMON
GOODS: REINVENTING EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 15, 21 (Adrienne
Heritier ed., 2002). This is sometimes referred to as a public-private partnership arrangement, or “the formation of cooperative relationships between government, profit-making
firms, and non-profit private organizations to fulfill a policy function.” Stephen H.
Linder & Pauline Vaillancourt Rosenau, Mapping the Terrain of the Public-Private Policy Partnership, in PUBLIC-PRIVATE POLICY PARTNERSHIPS 1, 5 (Pauline Vaillancourt
Rosenau ed., 2000). As a result, global governance is “rule making and power exercise at
a global scale . . . [and] can be exercised by states, religious organizations, and business
corporations, as well as by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.”
Robert O. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, in TAMING
GLOBALIZATION: FRONTIERS OF GOVERNANCE 130, 132 (David Held & Mathias KoenigArchibugi eds., 2003).
2. For the purposes of this Article, an NGO shall be defined in accordance with the
United Nations’ definition which notes an NGO as “any non-profit voluntary citizens’
group which is organized on a local, national or international level.” United Nations,
http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/brochure.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2005).
3. Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy: Unsolicited Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations with International Nongovernmental Organizations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 371, 379 (2001).
4. See Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in
World Politics, AM. POL. SCI. REV., Feb. 2005, at 1.

142

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 31:1

in international governance and fails to recognize the importance of
delegation as another legitimate source of authority.5
Most scholars treat NGOs as a homogenous group and base their theoretical and normative arguments around such a generalization, even when
recognizing NGOs vary significantly on a number of levels.6 This Article
seeks to advance the literature on NGO accountability by unpacking
NGOs by functional role in international governance and relating these
roles to accountability theory. Failing to recognize these functional distinctions, many theories of NGO participation in international govern-

5. Robert O. Keohane, Political Accountability 14–17 (paper presented to Conference on Delegation to International Organizations, Park City, Utah, May 3–4, 2002);
Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Democracy, Accountability and Global Governance 1 (Harvard Univ. Politics Research Group, Working Paper No. 01-4, 2001), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/nye/ggajune.pdf; Robert E. Goodin, Democratic
Accountability: The Third Sector and All 12 (John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working
Paper No. 19, 2003); Miles Kahler, Defining Accountability Up: The Global Economic
Multilaterals (May 17–18, 2002) (working paper, presented at Miliband Conference on
Global Governance and Public Accountability, London School of Economics) (arguing
national governments have adequate institutional control over international institutions to
which power is delegated).
6. Wide variations in NGOs’ purposes, sizes, competencies, functions, membership
structures, and funding sources, for example, impact the effectiveness of accountability
mechanisms and counsel for greater specificity in establishing accountability mechanisms. For a discussion of some of these wide NGO variations, see, for example, Benedict Kingsbury, First Amendment Liberalism as Global Legal Architecture: Ascriptive
Groups and the Problems of the Liberal NGO Model of International Civil Society, 3
CHI. J. INT’L L. 183, 186 (2002); S. Tarrow, Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics, 4 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 1 (2001) (noting sometimes
NGOs are really state bodies in disguise to gain increased political influence); J.A.
Scholte, Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance, 8 GOVERNANCE 281, 295–
99 (2002); Ngaire Woods, Global Governance and the Role of Institutions, in
GOVERNING GLOBALIZATION 25, 28 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2002); John
Micklethwait & Adrian Wooldridge, The Globalization Backlash, FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept.–
Oct. 2001, at 16 (“NGOs claim to represent global civil society. But nobody elects
them.”); David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Rocky Shoals of International Law, 62
NAT’L INTEREST 35, 37 (2001) (“NGOs are not elected, not accountable to any body politic.”); Jeremy Rabkin, International Law vs. the American Constitution—Something’s
Got to Give, 55 NAT’L INTEREST 30, 37 (1999) (“NGOs never have to face voters or bear
any sort of accountability.”). The variations are important because, for example, increasing the openness or representativeness of governance structures may undermine accountability for nondecisions when deadlocks or “joint decision traps” occur (made more likely
by the increased breadth of participation). See Fritz W. Scharpf, Coordination in Hierarchies and Networks, in GAMES IN HIERARCHIES AND NETWORKS: ANALYTICAL AND
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS (Fritz W. Scharpf
ed., 1993).
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ance have missed the mark, focusing primarily on ensuring greater accountability of NGOs generally. This Article seeks to remove the debate
regarding the provision of accountability from the level of the actor to
that of function.7 This Article proposes the participation of NGOs in international governance should not always depend upon democratic accountability. Instead, the accountability required of these NGOs should
depend upon the particular governance function they perform. As a result, the mechanisms used to achieve such accountability will necessarily
vary by function.
Part II begins with a discussion of accountability in international governance, establishing a general typology of accountability mechanisms.8
Part III then describes some of the different functions performed by
NGOs in international governance, providing examples of how such systems are arranged under existing frameworks and illustrating the relationship between the function performed and the accountability needed.
Part IV seeks to refine NGO accountability theory by proposing a new
model to guide NGO participation: one linking accountability to function. Part IV also identifies some concerns in implementing the theory.
The Article concludes by calling for further research into the potential
drawbacks of implementing this new framework so an appropriate balance between fairness, operability, and accountability may be reached in
international governance.

7. While it may be argued the underlying assumption behind this framework is that
it does not matter who governs, so long as appropriate accountability controls are enforced, this argument would be an over-extension of this Article’s proposal. This Article
does not seek to undermine the authority of State actors in international governance, nor
does it suggest States are losing power in international governance. Rather, it questions
the assumption that accountability mechanisms must be differentiated between authority
delegated to administrative government agencies and authority delegated to non-state
actors with sufficient controls to assure adequate accountability to the delegator. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to evaluate whether, after establishing a baseline accountability requirement for a particular function, particular actors must be held to different standards based upon different levels of legitimacy as international governance actors.
Normatively, such a differentiation seems questionable, since accountability mechanisms
are designed to constrain power, whatever its form. These actor-based legitimacy concerns may better be dealt with through other forms of legitimization, rather than through
accountability controls, but this Article does not take a position on this issue.
8. This categorization is based largely upon the work of Keohane, Grant, and Nye.
See generally Grant & Keohane, supra note 4; Keohane & Nye, supra note 5.
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II. ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL REGIMES
Although accountability is “an under-explored concept whose meaning
remains evasive,”9 the purpose of this Article is not to define the concept
with any more lucidity than theorists who have come before; instead, it is
to explore a new mode of analysis for how accountability mechanisms
should be structured. Generally, an “accountability system is the set of
accountability mechanisms, and their interactions, that characterize a
given governance system.”10 Accountability implies information and the
ability to sanction power-wielders for misbehavior: “[a]ccountability refers to relationships in which principals have the ability to demand answers from agents to questions about their proposed or past behavior, to
discern that behavior, and to impose sanctions on agents in the event that
they regard the behavior as unsatisfactory.”11 Accountability is important
in international governance because “to a greater degree than domestic
lawmaking, the international process suffers from an accountability deficit.”12
A. Democratic Accountability
Most theorists have defined and operationalized accountability by reference to democratic legitimacy, elections, and the sanction of removal
as yardsticks of accountability and legitimacy.13 Democratic accountability presumes the existence of a demos14 whose will can be measured.

9. Andreas Schedler, Conceptualizing Accountability, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING
STATE: POWER AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 13, 13 (Andreas Schedler et
al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE].
10. Keohane, Political Accountability, supra note 5, at 9.
11. Id. at 3. See also John Dunn, Situating Democratic Political Accountability, in
DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 329, 335 (Adam Przeworski et al.
eds., 1999). It is important to note the principals, or accountability holders, need not be
the beneficiaries of the agents’ actions.
12. Paul B. Stephan, The New International Law—Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global Order, 70 COLO. L. REV. 1555, 1562 (1999).
13. This Article does not presume democratic legitimacy is the only or necessarily the
appropriate form of legitimacy to which regimes and organizations should aspire. However, it is one of the norms discussed in this Article and representative accountability
(often referred to as democratic accountability) is assumed throughout many of the discussions in this Article.
14. A demos is considered “a polity with members by . . . whom and for whom democratic discourse with its many variants takes place.” J. H. H. Weiler, European NeoConstitutionalism: In Search of Foundations for the European Constitutional Order, 44
POL. STUD. 517, 523 (1996). It has been referred to as “a sovereign authority that decides
important political matters either directly in popular assemblies or indirectly through its
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While the existence of an international demos is a matter of significant
contention,15 some authors have suggested cross-border and international
issue- and function-specific demoi do exist.16 Whether an international
demos exists remains a debate. However, civil society registered its view
on the matter in Seattle, proclaiming loudly through protests at the World
Trade Organization meeting in 1999 that without abilities to relate civil
society’s views to the governing bodies of international legal regimes,
those regimes may become less legitimate.17 This has led some to conclude a “democracy deficit” exists, necessitating greater accountability.18
This Article agrees democratic accountability may be important and necessary to ensure the legitimacy of governance regimes, but believes the
uniform requirement of democratic accountability to be excessive. Instead, this mode of accountability should be required only when functions performed by NGOs relate to the representation of a particular
populace.
representatives.” Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations be Democratic? A
Skeptic’s View, in DEMOCRACY’S EDGES 20 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds.,
1999).
15. Compare PIPPA NORRIS, A VIRTUOUS CIRCLE: POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN
POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (2000) (generally arguing national identities are not sufficiently global to support a representative global demos) with DAVID BEETHAM,
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 137 (1999) (“[T]he demos that is democracy’s subject
has come to be defined almost exclusively in national terms, and the scope of democratic
rights has been limited to the bounds of the nation-state.”).
16. See Tanja Brühl, The Privatisation of International Environmental Governance,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2001 BERLIN CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS OF
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND THE NATION
STATE 371, 376–77 (Frank Biermann et al. eds., 2002), available at http://www.
glogov.org/upload/public%20files/pdf/publications/bc%20proceedings/bc2001/bruhl.pdf.
This is because a demos is defined by populations which, having a sense of trust and
public spirit, engage in public discourse to recognize the existence of mutual rights and
obligations of its members, reinforcing feelings of solidarity within the population. See
Michael Zürn, Democratic Governance Beyond the Nation-State: The EU and Other
International Institutions, 6 EUR. J. INT’L REL. 183, 195–200 (2000).
17. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 22.
18. E.g., Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: From Government to Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 379
(2001). Other authors have argued even democratic decisions at the State level are often
no longer “democratic” in so far as they create externalities on neighboring States’ citizens who had no opportunity to participate in the decision-making. See Daniele Archibugi, Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY:
STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 198, 204 (Daniele Archibugi et al. eds., 1998)
[hereinafter RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY]; David Held, Democracy and Globalisation, in RE-IMAGINING POLITICAL COMMUNITY, supra at 11, 14.
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Levels of internal democratic accountability vary significantly between
NGOs,19 and some have argued “the role of NGOs is not to be representative but to raise awareness.”20 However, the vast majority of NGO accountability scholars dealing with this issue evaluate NGO accountability
based solely upon these internal controls.21 Their claim is NGO representatives generally are not elected by their memberships, and members
typically are passive contributors who do not review or direct the NGOs’
actions.22
However, this criticism of NGO democratic accountability tends to
conflate internal and external accountability.23 The external democratic
accountability charge is NGOs are only accountable to their membership,
without allowing the beneficiaries a right to determine the NGO actions
affecting them.24 However, both of these criticisms depend upon the
norm of democracy to legitimate NGO involvement in international governance. This Article posits legitimate governance need not always be
based upon the norm of democracy, especially of elections, but recognizes it may be an appropriate focus for certain functions.25
The external democratic accountability critique faces an additional
problem: it does not justify requiring NGOs to represent the beneficiaries
of its actions. Should a corporation be held accountable primarily by its
shareholders or its consumers? The same issue applies here: members are
the primary determinants of internal NGO accountability, while beneficiaries are rightly viewed as external accountability holders who at all
times possess reputational controls, but who may possess greater rights
to hold NGOs accountable depending upon the function performed by
19. See David Chandler, New Rights for the Old? Cosmopolitan Citizenship and the
Critique of State Sovereignty, 51 POL. STUD. 332, 336 (2003).
20. Id. at 340 (internal quotation omitted). See also Johan Galtung, Alternative Models for Global Democracy, in GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: KEY DEBATES 143, 155 (Barry Holden ed., 2000).
21. See Peter J. Spiro, The Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 161, 163 (2002).
22. Id.
23. See id.
24. A. Claire Cutler et al., The Contours and Significance of Private Authority in
International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 333, 369 (A.
Claire Cutler et al. eds., 1999).
25. Therefore, this Article does not go so far as some scholars as to suggest NGOs
can claim legitimate representative rights over beneficiaries without being democratic or
accountable to such beneficiaries. See Klaus Dieter Wolf, Private Actors and the Legitimacy of Governance Beyond the State, paper presented at ECPR Joint Session Workshop, Grenoble (2001), http://www.ifs.tu-darmstadt.de/fileadmin/pg/media/papers/civil.
pdf.
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the organization. For instance, where the NGO claims to represent the
beneficiaries in a lobbying activity, beneficiaries should have a stronger
right to constrain NGO actions than where NGOs are merely establishing
standards they believe will help certain populations.26
Although democratic accountability can be important, a leading democratic political theorist, Robert Dahl, noted, “international organizations are not and are not likely to be democratic.”27 Dahl suggests international institutions be analyzed as bureaucratic bargaining systems, not
as democratic governance regimes.28 This view has begun to take hold,
as the traditional demos theory of legitimacy has largely been replaced
by international relations theorists who break legitimacy into two basic
components: input or institutional legitimacy, which is derived from democratic expressions of the affected public’s will,29 and output or taskspecific legitimacy, which is based upon the effectiveness of actions
taken to achieve normatively salient goals.30 This Article posits accountability, recognized to contribute to legitimacy,31 should undergo a similar
dual analysis.32
Although traditional task-specific accountability analyses have focused
on the effectiveness of governance outcomes,33 this Article seeks to rede26. See id.
27. Dahl, supra note 14, at 32.
28. Id.
29. Institutional legitimacy can also be found through tradition and symbols. See
Keohane & Nye, supra note 5. Since these forms of legitimacy are not readily encompassed within accountability structures or applicable to international institutions, they are
not discussed in this Article. See id.
30. See Fritz W. Scharpf, Interdependence and Democratic Legitimation 2 (Max
Planck Inst., Working Paper No. 98/2, 1998), available at http://www.mpi-fgkoeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp98-2/wp98-2.html; FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GAMES REAL
ACTORS PLAY: ACTOR-CENTERED INSTITUTIONALISM IN POLICY RESEARCH 153 (1997);
PENTTI SADENIEMI, PRINCIPLES OF LEGITIMACY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1995);
see also Alan F. Fowler, Assessing NGO Performance: Difficulties, Dilemmas, and a
Way Ahead, in BEYOND THE MAGIC BULLET: NGO PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD 169 (Michael Edwards & David Hulme eds., 1996)
[hereinafter BEYOND THE MAGIC BULLET] (arguing for performance-based analysis of
NGOs to include output, outcome, and impact related measures); Debora Spar & James
Dail, Of Measurement and Mission: Accounting for Performance in Non-Governmental
Organizations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 171, 177–78 (2002) (discussing Fowler’s performance
analysis framework).
31. Grant & Keohane, supra note 4.
32. This follows Grant and Keohane’s analysis of democratic and non-democratic
forms of accountability. See id.
33. See, e.g., Ngaire Woods, Who Should Govern the World Economy: The Challenges of Globalization and Governance, 9 RENEWAL 73, 78 (2001) (“The democratic
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fine the analysis to legitimize the performance of the tasks themselves
through procedural mechanisms which promote both greater internal and
external accountability.34 A task-specific approach makes clear not all
tasks or functions need to be legitimized by governance outcomes even
at the international level where the existence of a demos is heavily questioned. Varying combinations of input and output controls can promote
legitimacy in different functional circumstances and, depending upon the
mechanisms required, can promote democratic accountability.35 This Article does not propose a democracy- or delegatory-based accountability
control system is appropriate in all cases,36 but rather legitimizing controls will depend upon the functions performed. Accordingly, this Article
posits the traditional emphasis on democratic principles to guide accountability controls is misplaced.37
B. Moving Beyond Democratic Accountability
Although there has been a historic over-reliance on democratic controls, alternative measures to hold non-state actors accountable, such as
profitability, are not necessarily appropriate or valuable yardsticks for
determining NGO performance.38 Basing their typology on a delegatory
model of international governance, Keohane, Grant and Nye demonstrate
the existence of multiple forms of internal and external accountability,
though they question the ability of some of the mechanisms they describe
to adequately hold some international governance actors accountable in

legitimacy of ‘network governance’ relies on a new way of conceiving of democracy
which . . . shifts the focus from the ‘inputs’ of the decision-making system (i.e. elections
and representative government) to the quality of the ‘outputs’ of the system.”).
34. While authors have discussed procedural mechanisms in terms of internal accountability constraints, it may be equally applicable to external accountability, where
stakeholders are not members of NGOs, but rather beneficiaries. See U.N. Dev. Programme, Human Dev. Report Office, Civil Society and Accountability 2 (2002), available
at http://hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/background_papers/2002/Kaldor_2002.pdf (prepared by Mary Kaldor).
35. This combination of input- and output-based accountability controls exists even in
the United States, widely hailed as a country with strong democratic accountability controls. See Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 6–7, 26 (noting legal accountability might
promote both input- and output-based legitimacy).
36. For a discussion of the need for an international demos to support democratic
governance, see Zürn, supra note 16.
37. Grant & Keohane, supra note 4.
38. Spar & Dail, supra note 30, at 176. For different approaches to assessing NGO
performance, see id. at 176 n.12.
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certain circumstances.39 The grab bag of control mechanisms derived
from the delegatory system of governance referenced by Keohane, Grant
and Nye include fiscal, market, supervisory, legal, peer, market, reputational, and hierarchical accountability mechanisms.40
Fiscal accountability, also known as financial conditionality, refers to
the external controls which the individual or institution holding the purse
string can exert over the governance actor.41 These controls include not
only conditions a financier may impose upon an NGO, but also may include, inter alia, national regulations preventing an NGO from engaging
in for-profit activities or decisions made by individuals with conflicts of
interests. Keohane and Grant suggest this form of accountability is
particularly strong for NGOs which are highly dependent upon external
grants and funding.42 The necessity of financing for sustainability creates
a competitive financing market, with NGOs seeking to carve out market
niches and branding.43 This competitive effect may cause NGOs to act
like for-profit actors—similar to the situation in which NGOs compete
for government contracts—and therefore may cause NGOs to act contrary to the interests of their memberships, their funders’ interests, or
their beneficiaries.44
Similar to fiscal accountability, market accountability, or the means by
which NGOs obtain financing or membership in a competitive NGO environment, can also be a powerful external method to control runaway
NGO behavior.45 This form of accountability in the NGO context, however, is less compelling, as most NGOs create particular niche markets or
brands, making their services less substitutable and thereby decreasing
the likelihood perfect NGO markets for financing, services, or memberships exist.
Supervisory accountability is another form of external accountability
whereby those who have delegated authority to the NGOs may withdraw
such authority or censure the NGOs for failing to follow instructions. In
39. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 1–5; see also Grant & Keohane, supra note 4;
Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative
Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2003) (arguing market accountability mechanisms
may not be sufficient to ensure proper provision of some social services by non-state
actors).
40. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 4–5; Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 8.
41. Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 8.
42. Id.
43. Kaldor, supra note 34, at 24.
44. See DAVID LEWIS, THE MANAGEMENT OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL DEVELOPMENT
ORGANISATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 199–200 (2001).
45. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 9–10.
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international governance this is a particularly powerful type of accountability mechanism, as evidenced by the adherence of the World Bank and
IMF to the standards demanded by the Member States overseeing (and
funding) their operation.46 This form of accountability control is even
more powerful for NGOs dependent upon government contracts and relationships for viability and financing.
Another external constraint upon NGO behavior is legal accountability.
Although this form of accountability has potency at the domestic level to
prevent private inurement or other self-serving behavior of officers, at
the international level, without greater harmonization, it will likely be
fairly weak at ensuring accountability.47 Additionally, no international
law governs the operation of NGOs. Rather, legal accountability in international governance might be considered contract accountability,
whereby NGOs are required to follow the terms of a contract signed with
other governance actors. Failure to abide by those terms could have the
same individual and organizational consequences as those imposed by
legal sanctions or penalties. This revised view of legal accountability in
the international governance context indicates such constraints might be
important for NGOs acting in a governance capacity.
Peer accountability is how actors in a horizontal relationship with the
NGO performing a governance function hold the NGO to certain standards of accountability. NGOs often act as coalitions to coalesce the necessary resources, expertise, and relationships to achieve particular functions;48 peer accountability regulates the relationship between these partnerships to a certain extent. However, as discussed below, this form of
accountability is questionable as a source of normatively justified constraints on actor behavior.
Concerns of exacerbating representational imbalances through participation of unaccountable NGOs have caused some scholars to suggest the
greater use of peer accountability mechanisms to ensure the appropriate
representativeness of NGOs.49 This argument suggests, however, it might
be limited to a situation of network governance.50 To the author’s mind,
46. See id. at 8–9.
47. See id. at 9–12.
48. Id.
49. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 29–30.
50. Partnerships and linkages, especially with local groups, are crucial for the success
of many international NGOs. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS
BEYOND BORDERS 23–29 (1998); Grant & Keohane, supra note 4. In such situations, the
partnership has a normative right to hold members of the partnership (externally) accountable with respect to actions taken affecting the partnership. See Paul Wapner, De-
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peer review is rarely, if ever, a normatively satisfactory means by which
to hold actors accountable, but is only a second- or third-best solution.
Since peer organizations are only very indirectly affected by the actions
of other similarly situated NGOs,51 their normative right to hold other
NGOs accountable is limited at best (when not a partner in a particular
governance function) and may be limited further based on the particular
functions performed by NGOs.
Additionally, little normative support is provided for the concept of using peer accountability mechanisms instead of other accountability controls in non-network governance structures. This is important because
where NGOs perform actions similar to government entities, or replace
what might otherwise be government activities, requiring less accountability assurances of NGOs than of government actors may present opportunities for game-playing and other self-serving activities. This Article does not directly oppose such theories, although it seemingly conflicts with existing theories of accountability which suggest different actors should not be required to meet the same accountability controls, relying upon (unequal) checks and balances as accountability controls.52
Rather, this theory suggests function, rather than actor, is how accountability controls should be established.53

fending Accountability in NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 202 (2002) (“Whenever an NGO
links or otherwise collaborates with another, it opens itself up to scrutiny and evaluation.
To the degree that NGOs find strength in doing so, however, accountability becomes part
of the price of increased transnational effectiveness.”). However, the right to hold actors
accountable or impose sanctions upon those other organizations is normatively suspect.
Funding competition may promote such self-serving behavior, but the right of these peer
organizations to hold each other accountable is limited, since they do not purport to act
on each other’s behalf.
51. Other NGOs might be affected by the actions of a particular NGO through reputational effects on the NGO sector or as a result of information failures attributing improper
NGO actions not exclusively to the offending NGO. See EUGENE BARDACH, GETTING
AGENCIES TO WORK TOGETHER: THE PRACTICE AND THEORY OF MANAGERIAL CRAFTSMANSHIP 144–46 (1998). Sole reliance on peer accountability mechanisms may, in fact,
promote the creation of collusive networks. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 45.
52. See, e.g., Goodin, supra note 5, at 37–38. Goodin’s analysis, however, often conflates internal and external accountability, making theoretical extrapolations from his
argument difficult. See id. at 42.
53. This Article is open to the possibility the theory it propounds might require incorporation of the two theories insofar as actors performing a particular function would require particular accountability controls, though the exact form or extent of those controls
might vary depending upon the actor. Practically, the form of accountability must necessarily vary by actor, as different procedural mechanisms are necessary to implement intended accountability controls. However, this Article considers the constraining effect on
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Reputational accountability is the least well-defined of the various accountability mechanisms laid out in Keohane, Grant, and Nye’s typology. They recognize this form of accountability is often dependent upon,
or even coterminous with, other forms of accountability, especially market accountability, though it is possible reputational effects may exist
outside those of other accountability constraints.54
The argument goes: reputational forces regulate the extent to which
NGOs must address internal accountability, since no exit barriers exist
for members, and the NGO “markets” for membership are generally
competitive.55 Albert Hirschman, however, has shown the dangers of this
reasoning. He notes where individuals can exit an organization’s membership easily and join another organization; there is little incentive for
the individual to use her voice to improve the organization.56 Given the
sheer number of NGOs, even in a particular issue area, competition between NGOs is not likely to significantly contribute to greater internal
accountability. So long as a particular NGO captures the majority of an
individual’s preferences, the NGO may make a number of minor policy
choices without membership support or fear of significant reprisal.57
Additionally, where members seek to hold their representative organizations accountable, there are significant barriers to entry, which come in
the form of information costs.58 An individual may have invested a sigactor behavior to be theoretically equivalent for all actors performing a particular function. Differential treatment based on type of organization, then, is justified only to the
extent such treatment can equalize the ultimate level of accountability achieved across
organizations performing the same governance function. This, however, would not justify, from a normative perspective, the use of different types of accountability controls to
equalize total accountability; it would only justify a greater level of the same controls
used to ensure accountability of other actors.
54. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 17; Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 9.
55. See Spiro, supra note 21, at 163–64,166–67 (also noting some concerns regarding
monopoly power may exist in certain circumstances).
56. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSE TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 84 (1970).
57. See generally Jonathan R. Macey, Packaged Preferences and the Institutional
Transformation of Interests, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443 (1994).
58. Scholars on this topic have typically assumed basic, media-related monitoring is
sufficient to achieve internal accountability, but this again conflates the issue of internal
and external sovereignty to the extent it is assumed media-related monitoring is accurate
and wholly accepted by the membership. See, e.g., Moisés Naím, Lori’s War, FOREIGN
POL’Y, Spring 2000, at 28, 39. Spiro analogized NGO membership to corporate shareholder management (who can similarly enter and exit with relative ease) which Spiro
claims is formally clear, but practically limited due to the high costs of monitoring and
collective action problems. Spiro, supra note 21, at 165. But see Goodin, supra note 5, at
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nificant amount of energy into learning about an organization’s activities,
and after review of those activities, suggested new directions for the organization. If those suggestions fall on deaf ears, she may choose to
leave. However, prior to joining an organization, she does not necessarily
know whether it is highly representative without a significant amount of
research.
Additionally, in order for any organization to be held truly accountable
by its internal membership through reputational mechanisms, the individual members must also incur significant information-gathering costs
to learn about the organization’s activities and then incur moderate participation costs. It therefore may be unrealistic to expect NGO competition alone would achieve greater internal accountability and representativeness.59 This is borne out in practice, where such competition exists,
but few organizations are held accountable to their memberships directly,
especially in lower-order decisions.
While the competition issue is usually buttressed by assertions NGOs’
claims to legitimacy depend upon self-regulation, or the creation of internal accountability mechanisms,60 this approach falls short as a framework for establishing accountability. As an accountability control, competition establishes a reliance upon other, (generally) non-regime-related
organizations to hold the participating NGOs to account.61 From both
systemic and normative perspectives, this seems as undesirable as peer
accountability mechanisms.
Finally, NGOs might regulate themselves through the internal accountability mechanism of hierarchy. Individual officers and agents of an
NGO are held accountable to standards established by the NGO’s management and organizational structure. Failure to abide by the NGO’s own
standards may result in salary cuts or firing and therefore can act as significant deterrents to impropriety.62 For instance, incorporation creates
hierarchical internal accountability within the organization.63 However,
7 (“[I]n the non-profit sector there is simply no equivalent to ‘voters’ in the state sector or
‘shareholders’ in the market sector.”). The likelihood of media-related monitoring is perhaps even greater in the corporate context than in NGO context, so this argument seems
to lack much merit. At best, Spiro’s argument counsels for greater monitoring of corporate accountability when corporations are acting in democratic international governance
schemes.
59. See Spiro, supra note 21, at 163.
60. See L. David Brown et al., Globalization, NGOs and Multi-Sectoral Relations 27
(Hauser Ctr. For Nonprofit Orgs., Harvard Univ., Working Paper No. 1, 2000).
61. Id.
62. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 5–7.
63. Id. at 6–7.
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while incorporation may control some rent-seeking behavior by individual officers, it does little to influence the behavior of a fly-by-night or
otherwise wholly corrupt NGO. It does, however, create transparency
and reporting obligations which may increase the cost of being corrupt
and thereby increase accountability.
As this cursory discussion illustrates, non-democratic accountability
mechanisms exist. However, each method of control has its own unique
strengths and weaknesses and range of applicability, all of which is often
highly context- and function-dependent. Often, however, a particular action may be held to account by a number of different mechanisms. The
task of the accountability holder is then to determine both the type and
extent of the particular mechanism to be applied. This is no easy task.
This Article seeks to begin this process by aligning particular governance
functions to the type of accountability controls most appropriate from a
normative standpoint. Although not definitive in its approach, the Article
does suggest a prototypical framework which the author expects will require further refinement and development to make it fully operational.
Although this Article breaks new ground in establishing a functionbased approach to accountability controls, some scholars have already
illustrated some of the context-dependency of delegatory or nondemocratic accountability controls, noting, for instance, market and reputational accountability depend upon transparency for effectiveness.64 Despite these contextual concerns and prerequisites to effectiveness, many
authors have seemed to assume the mere existence of these accountability mechanisms somehow means such mechanisms are sufficient to hold
actors accountable.65 For instance, even Keohane has suggested NGOs
64. See Thomas Hale, Managing the Disaggregation of Development: How the Johannesburg “Type II” Partnerships can be Made Effective 23–26 (2003), http://www.
wws.princeton.edu/mauzerall/wws402f_s03/JP.ThomasHale.pdf.
65. See Thomas Hale & Denise L. Mauzerall, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally:
Can the Johannesburg Partnerships Coordinate Action on Sustainable Development?, 13
J. ENVTL. DEV. 220, 226–29, available at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/mauzerall/
papers/Hale.Mauzerall.JED.final.pdf. Hale and Mauzerall argue reputational, market and,
indirectly, financial accountability, can hold private partnerships accountable to a broadbased constituency of affected stakeholders. Id. See also Hale, supra note 64, at 22.
However, they do not identify which stakeholders should have a right to hold the actors
accountable or how they are affected or even relate to the accountability mechanisms
assumed to be effective. Additionally, they undermine their own argument by recognizing “reputational and market accountability . . . does not work equally well on all types of
actors. ‘Brand-less’ corporations, non-democratic governments, and projects with guaranteed funding sources are resistant to the kind of reputational and market enforcement
powers the proposed regulatory regime would apply.” Hale & Mauzerall, supra at 19;
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“are highly vulnerable to threats to their reputations.”66 This Article argues even where contextual prerequisites can be met, accountability
mechanisms are not necessarily appropriate or effective constraints on
actor behavior when performing different functions. This is particularly
important since “[a]ccountability is not a pure good” where more is necessarily better,67 and “the total possibilities for participation are inescapably constrained by the need to accomplish the institution’s tasks.”68
NGO involvement in global governance must be limited both by number
and type of organizations in order to ensure governance occurs.
While contextualizing these issues is difficult and should necessarily
be beyond the scope of academic work such as this, the importance of
this analysis is to reveal the level of generality and false grouping is
standard practice in NGO scholarship and the need for a more functionbased analysis of accountability. The amount of allowable government
support, for instance, should depend upon the particular functions performed by the NGO. Some political groups may receive government
Hale, supra note 64, at 26. Hale and Mauzerall incorrectly understand Keohane and
Nye’s reputational and market accountability issues by linking them with funding, and
also consider many of the accountability mechanisms discussed by Keohane and Nye to
be “horizontal” forms of accountability. Hale & Mauzerall, supra, at 14–15, 19; Hale,
supra note 64, at 22. However, despite Schmitter’s definition of horizontal accountability
as “the existence of permanently constituted, mutually recognized collective actors at
multiple levels of aggregation within a policy that have equivalent capacities to monitor
each other’s behavior and to react to each other’s initiatives,” Philippe C. Schmitter, The
Limits of Horizontal Accountability, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING STATE, supra note 9, at
59, 61, this view of accountability is more akin to “checks and balances,” see Guillermo
O’Donnell, Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, in THE SELF-RESTRAINING
STATE, supra note 9, at 29, 39 (stating effective horizontal accountability requires state
agencies with authority and autonomy, as well as a willingness to oversee, remedy, and
sanction other agencies’ unlawful actions), which are not technically accountability controls. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 7–9. Instead, horizontal accountability truly
implies peer accountability, not accountability through the participation of multiple levels
of affected stakeholders who may not be social equals. See Keohane, Political Accountability, supra note 5, at 20. In fact, “NGOs are weak compared to governments.” Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, supra note 1, at 145. Although
this Article does not discount the importance of transparency generally for ensuring accountability, it nevertheless does not support the exclusively project-based view of Hale
and Mauzerall. Rather, this Article believes that both internal and external accountability
concerns must be addressed equally for accountability and legitimacy to be ensured.
66. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, supra note 1, at
148.
67. See Robert O. Keohane, Commentary on the Democratic Accountability of NonGovernmental Organizations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 477, 477 (2002).
68. Kingsbury, supra note 6, at 186 (citation omitted).
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funds while others do not; if an NGO is to lobby an international organization for a particular policy, is it appropriate to include political groups
funded by States? Or should only fully independent groups be allowed to
participate? The answers to these questions and others can and should
vary based upon the function the NGO seeks to perform and the international regime’s normative values. This Article seeks to establish a basic
functional typology for establishing accountability controls for NGOs
participating in international governance.
Most prominent NGO scholars, including those demanding greater internal and external accountability controls, consider NGOs to be relatively weak institutional players. For instance, Keohane does not recommend strong accountability controls of “relatively weak NGOs,” but
notes “as a particular NGO gains influence, it can exert effects, for good
or ill, on people not its members. At this point, it can be legitimately held
externally accountable as other powerful entities operate in world politics.”69 Keohane suggests such limited controls because he considers
NGOs to be mere lobbyists.70 This Article agrees with Keohane’s passing
comment regarding the increasing power of external accountability controls as an NGO gains influence, but takes a slightly different approach:
as NGOs perform different functions, the level of power they wield over
an international governance system changes, and therefore the strength of
controls based on internal accountability and external accountability to
the regime itself should vary according to the importance of its function
and level of control over outcomes. External accountability to beneficiaries, on the other hand, should only be implicated where there is a possible impact upon the choice or rights of beneficiaries.71 Departing from
most scholarship on NGO accountability, this Article seeks to determine
which forms of accountability are appropriate when. As Keohane explains, “[T]o establish that some accountability exists is not to reach a
normatively significant conclusion. From a normative standpoint, the
relevant question is whether a given set of accountability relationships is
appropriate with respect to their type and extent.”72 This theory extends
the normative debate to the function of the actor as well, recognizing

69. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, supra note 1, at
148.
70. Id.
71. See THE STRUGGLE FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: THE WORLD BANK, NGOS, AND GRASSROOTS MOVEMENTS 12–17 (Jonathan A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998).
72. Keohane, Political Accountability, supra note 5, at 9.
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“the particular configuration of accountability mechanisms in individual
institutions matters.”73
Though accountability controls are necessary, both the form and
strength of the controls should be, in the first instance, dependent upon
the function which the NGO intends to perform, as opposed to analyzing
the NGO itself (whether based upon a comparative power analysis or
otherwise). NGO legitimacy in international governance is largely derived from claims of representation of under-served, disenfranchised, or
otherwise disempowered populations.74
[NGO’s] claims to a legitimate voice over policy are based on the disadvantaged people for whom they claim to speak, and on the abstract
principles they espouse. But they are internally accountable to wealthy,
relatively public-spirited people in the United States and other rich
countries, who do not experience the results of their actions. Hence
there is a danger that they will engage in symbolic politics, satisfying to
their internal constituencies but unresponsive to the real needs of the
people whom they claim to serve.75

This is especially acute since the United Nations (UN) defines NGOs as
not-for-profit entities.76
From a normative standpoint, however, NGOs need not be externally
accountable to the beneficiaries of NGO action, but rather only to its
members (funders, etc.), unless the NGO is acting as a “public” operative
arm of a governance regime or affects the rights or choices of its beneficiaries.77 This helps to resolve the problems arising when NGOs become
73. See Arthur Benz & Yannis Papadopoulos, Is Network Governance Democratic?
Different Assessments for the National and International Level (Center for Democratic
Governance, first draft, 2003), http://www.demnetgov.ruc.dk/conference/papers/HelsingoerAB-YP1.pdf.
74. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 378. Since the beginning of NGO involvement in
international governance, however, NGOs have gained significant policy expertise and
have gained a new source of legitimacy for involvement in international governance.
75. Keohane, Global Governance and Democratic Accountability, supra note 1, at
148.
76. See supra note 2.
77. See Brühl, supra note 16, at 378 (“As long as private actors do not decide authoritatively on public policy, they neither have to have a democratic structure nor do they
have to be elected by (sectoral) demoi.”) (internal citation omitted). Although the definition of “authoritatively” is not clear, this Article agrees with Brühl’s proposition insofar
as NGOs are not decision-makers. Where NGOs are decision-makers, even if part of a
larger group of decision-makers, then NGOs should be held accountable under democratic accountability mechanisms. However, this Article does not argue such accountability should necessarily extend beyond its membership.
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service providers on behalf of governance regimes but apply incorrect
strategies, undermining the effectiveness of other approaches, or diverting funds away from other, more successful ones.78 In such circumstances, the regime must be accountable to the beneficiaries to some extent, and output-based legitimacy concerns contain some validity. However, the NGO’s function, rather than its participation, is what determines the choices available to beneficiaries.79 Therefore, it does not matter for the beneficiaries who provides the service, but only the manner in
which it is provided.
Table 1 provides a basic overview of the typology established by this
Article, which shall be developed in greater detail in Part IV.A.80 Political functions are those functions which generally involve some level of
representation, and therefore require some modicum of democratic accountability to those represented, the level of which depends upon the
level of representation needed and the influence over the process exerted
by the NGO. Administrative functions, on the other hand, do not require
democratic representation, as such actions are related to performing governance functions designed to improve the management of the governance regime. Representation of internal member interests is therefore
correlated to that function, but can be achieved without necessitating
democratic accountability; fiscal and hierarchical controls may achieve
the needed efficiencies and spending controls to ensure good governance.
At all times, however, NGOs are acting as delegated authorities, performing governance functions in lieu of the regime and are therefore
primarily responsible to the governments sanctioning the NGO administrative actions. NGOs performing enforcement functions, depending
upon the NGO’s role in the enforcement process, must ensure accountability both to their memberships and possibly their beneficiaries, as well
as to the regime generally. Authority under such a governance arrangement is less one of delegation, however, as NGOs are generally involved
in an enforcement role to ensure independence and regime accountability
to the global demos. The next Parts will discuss the relationship between

78. See Sonia Arllano-Lopez & James F. Petras, Non-Governmental Organisations
and Poverty Alleviation in Bolivia, 25 DEV. & CHANGE 555 (1994).
79. See David Held, Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty, 8
LEGAL THEORY 1, 26 (2002).
80. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 4; Keohane & Nye, supra note 5. This table
excludes market and reputational controls, since they are not imposed by the listed actors.
Additionally, “hierarchical” subsumes all principal-agent relationships, including those of
member or beneficiary representation.
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Table 1: Mapping Accountability Controls to NGO Governance Functions

FUNCTIONS

Political Activities
Agenda-setting
Norm and Rule
Formation
General Participation
Administrative Duties
Certification
Standard Setting

Training and
Information
Service Provision

Other Administrative
Functions
Enforcement
Arbitration

Monitoring

ACCOUNTABILITY HOLDERS
InternalMembership

ExternalBeneficiaries

ExternalRegime

High:
hierarchical,
fiscal
High:
hierarchical,
fiscal
High:
hierarchical,
fiscal

Maybe:
hierarchical

None to
Limited:
peer
None to
Limited:
peer
None to
Limited:
peer

Limited:
hierarchical,
fiscal
Limited
to High:
hierarchical,
fiscal
Limited:
hierarchical,
fiscal

None to
Limited

Limited
to High:
hierarchical,
fiscal
Limited:
hierarchical,
fiscal

High:
hierarchical

Limited:
hierarchical,
fiscal

None to
Limited

High:
hierarchical,
fiscal

Maybe:
hierarchical

Maybe:
hierarchical
Maybe:
hierarchical

Maybe:
hierarchical
None to
Limited

None to
Limited

High:
legal, fiscal,
supervisory
High:
legal, fiscal,
supervisory,
peer
High:
legal, fiscal,
supervisory,
peer
High:
legal, fiscal,
supervisory,
hierarchical
High

High:
legal, fiscal,
supervisory,
hierarchical
None to
Moderate:
supervisory
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the accountability needed, normatively appropriate accountability
mechanisms, and the functions performed by NGOs in greater detail.
III. THE VARIED FUNCTIONS OF NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE
The deconstruction of accountability theory as applied to NGOs in the
previous Part suggests accountability controls depend upon the functions
undertaken by NGOs in international governance. Absent such a functional approach, NGOs participate in various governance functions without having duties to participate appropriately.81 This Part discusses the
varied functions NGOs perform in international governance to illustrate
the complexity of the issue and the need for more nuanced accountability
theories regarding NGO participation.82

81. Richard Devetak & Richard Higgott, Saving the Social Bond and Recovering the
Public Domain, in THE MARKET OR THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE & THE
ASSYMETRY OF POWER 20 (Daniel Drache ed., 2001), available at http://www.yorku.
ca/robarts/archives/pub_domain/pdf/apd_higgottfin.pdf.
82. NGO participation in international governance has blossomed in recent years and
has taken many different avenues. See Kal Raustiala, The “Participatory Revolution” in
International Environmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537, 538–39 (1997); Jonathan P. Doh & H. Teegen, Nongovernmental Organizations as Institutional Actors in
International Business: Theory and Implications, 11 INT’L BUS. REV. 665 (2002). See
generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Development of International Environmental Law, 68 CHI. KENT L. REV. 61 (1992). While
some have distinguished between various different civil society actors based on purpose,
function, and funding, limiting evaluation of NGOs to service provision and advocacy,
this Article expands the analysis of NGOs to whenever they perform any of the functions
associated primarily with non-NGO groups, including social movements, social organizations, and religious groups. See Kaldor, supra note 34, at 12 tbls. 1, 17, 19 (noting although distinct, social movements and social organizations may be considered NGOs).
Additionally, the analysis set forth by Kaldor and others is an actor-based model, as opposed to a function-based model, and does not attempt to map different accountability
controls to the different actors or functions performed. Similarly, other authors have discussed the role of NGOs in partnership arrangements with companies and in the creation
of corporate codes of conduct or privately-created standards. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Doh &
Terrence R. Guay, Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility: How Nongovernmental Organizations Influence Labor and Environmental Codes of Conduct (manuscript
on file with Brooklyn Journal of International Law); Bas Arts, “Green Alliances” of
Business and NGOs: New Styles of Self-Regulation or “Dead-End Roads?”, 9 CORP.
SOCIAL RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 26 (2002); Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal
Pluralism and the Decentered State: A Labor Law Critique of Codes of Corporate Conduct, 8 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 401 (2001). See also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE
APPAREL INDUSTRY AND CODES OF CONDUCT: A SOLUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CHILD
LABOR PROBLEM? 124–207 (1996), available at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/
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“[Public-private partnerships] can . . . be classified according to their
purposes and function into one of three categories,” either rule and standard setting, rule implementation, or service provision.83 This model,
established by Börzel and Risse, is a very useful start to this Article’s
analysis, despite excluding an examination of NGO participation when
performing political or lobbying functions.84 This Article follows the
same basic process in categorizing NGOs by function, with some slight
variations and greater detail. Despite this greater detail, of course, the
following categorization by no means provides an exhaustive list of functions NGOs may perform in governance regimes, but it does provide a
basic categorization and framework of NGO functions, thereby establishing a starting point for more nuanced discussions of NGO participation
in international governance.
A. Policy Formulation
Traditional scholarship on NGO participation in international governance has focused on NGO involvement in the creation of norms and policies. Thus begins this Article’s function-based analysis. Although direct
NGO involvement is “less frequent in the areas of international rule setting and implementation,”85 it nevertheless exists and is likely to increase
in the future.86 NGOs performing these functions are often likened to
Kaldor’s analysis of social movements, which depend upon the ability to
iiclp/apparel/overview.htm; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STATUS REPORT ON THE USE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LABELS WORLDWIDE (1993); Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, PublicPrivate Partnerships: Effective and Legitimate Tools of Transnational Governance?, in
COMPLEX SOVEREIGNTY: RECONSTITUTING POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY 195, 203–06 (Edgar Grande & Louis W. Pauly eds., 2004) (noting NGO involvement in the broad definition of governance through self-regulation in the shadow of
hierarchy or regime-imposed rules and through independent self-regulation adopted by
regimes). Privately-created standards later adopted by a governance regime are also beyond the scope of this Article, as NGOs creating such private standards were not part of
what might be termed a public-private partnership in the formulation of those standards.
See Börzel & Risse, supra, at 204. I do not address these arrangements which, under a
broad definition of governance, might be considered such. Rather, I restrict my analysis
to NGO roles in formulating policies adopted by international governments and in international governance as it relates to government-sanctioned and authorized action intended to replace or assist a function otherwise performed by a government institution or
its agent. See supra note 1.
83. Börzel & Risse, supra note 82, at 199 (noting public-private partnerships might be
categorized by ways in which they regulate behavior).
84. See id. at 198.
85. Börzel & Risse, supra note 82, at 204.
86. See id. at 204–06.
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mobilize members into action.87 This, in a sense, is a reliance upon the
“market accountability” mechanism.88 As will be shown in the following
sections, there are a number of different functions falling within the
broad category of policy formulation relying upon the purpose and representativeness of the NGOs seeking to perform those actions.
1. Agenda-Setting
Agenda-setting is one of the most important governance functions an
organization can perform, as it places items onto the table for discussion
and analysis, initiating the possibility of governance changes.89 Generally, agenda-setting functions are limited to State actors in international
governance regimes. However, where NGOs are instrumental in the formulation of the overarching policy framework or where they are incorporated into a state’s delegation directly, NGOs may have the ability to set
the agenda for discussion. The World Conservation Union (IUCN) is the
proto-typical example of this. The IUCN drafted the first version of the
Convention of Biological Diversity and then was successful in setting the
agenda of the Convention’s negotiations.90
Agenda-setting is important for accountability purposes since whoever
controls the agenda has control over the scope of the governance system
and its ability to change over time. Self-interest may dominate such
agenda-setting formulations, as actors with an interest in the status quo
may reject change through the formulation of the agenda.
2. Norm and Rule Formulation
Norm and rule formation, or rule-setting, is the most contentious role
NGOs play in international governance. Some suggest such a role implies a loss of State sovereignty.91 While this Article does not tackle this

87. See Kaldor, supra note 34, at 22.
88. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 5.
89. Although awareness building is generally considered an agenda-setting function,
this aspect of agenda-setting is evaluated in the general participation section below. For
the purposes of this section, agenda-setting is limited to formalized processes by which
participants in a governance regime place issues on the table for negotiation and action.
See P.J. Simmons & Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Managing Global Issues: An Introduction, in MANAGING GLOBAL ISSUES: LESSONS LEARNED 3, 12 (P.J. Simmons & Chantal de
Jonge Oudraat eds., 2001).
90. See Brühl, supra note 16, at 373.
91. See generally Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the “Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 958 (1996) (sug-

2005]

NGO ACCOUNTABILITY CONCERNS

163

issue, it does recognize NGO involvement in rule-setting can be legitimized. NGOs have successfully participated in rule-setting nationally,92
as well as in intergovernmental organizations and through independent
initiatives.93
The extent of NGO involvement in rule-setting, like any other functional role an NGO might take, varies significantly. NGOs are primarily
involved as rule setters through incorporation into official delegations,
which has occurred in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime, for
instance.94 However, NGOs might also be involved in rule-setting in
their own right. Amnesty International was crucial in shaping the Convention Against Torture and in establishing the International Criminal
Court.95 Similarly, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines had the
right to make statements and table treaty language (though not to vote)
during negotiations of the Convention on the Prohibition of AntiPersonnel Landmines.96 To a lesser extent, NGOs are involved in the
World Trade Organization and help to shape its outcomes.97
A shining example of the role of NGOs in rule-setting is found in the
World Commission on Dams (WCD).98 WCD consists of the World
gesting that nations cede some sovereignty to non-governmental organizations such as
the WTO).
92. See generally Philip J. Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance
of Negotiated Rulemaking, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32 (2000); Cary Coglianese, Assessing
the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 386 (2001); Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the
Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000); Siobhan Mee, Comment, Negotiated
Rulemaking and Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOS): Consensus Saves Ossification?, 25
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 213 (1997).
93. See Brühl, supra note 16, at 373–74.
94. See Börzel & Risse, supra note 82, at 199.
95. See WILLIAM KOREY, NGOS AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: “A CURIOUS GRAPEVINE” (1998).
96. See Motoko Mekata, Building Partnerships Toward a Common Goal: Experiences of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, in THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE
OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 143 (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000).
97. See generally Daniel C. Esty, Why the World Trade Organization Needs Environmental NGOs, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., available at
http://www.ictsd.org/English/esty.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2005) (discussing the role of
NGOs in the WTO, and arguing for expanded formal involvement). See also Peter Sutherland, The Doha Development Agenda: Political Challenges to the World Trading System—A Cosmopolitan Perspective, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 363, 374 (2005) (discussing the
WTO Secretariat’s interest in creating a low-level partnership between the WTO and
NGOs).
98. See Sanjeev Khagram, Toward Democratic Governance for Sustainable Development: Transnational Civil Society Organizing Around Big Dams, in THE THIRD FORCE:
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Bank, national governments, private industry, and NGOs.99 Although the
WCD’s work is advisory, it is a powerful source of international “soft
law.”100 Indeed, WCD has been nearly universally lauded as a successful
experiment to involve NGOs in rule-setting without undermining the authority of the regime or stymieing negotiations and has led to high quality outcomes considered unattainable under different circumstances.101
Norm and rule formation begs slightly different questions regarding
NGO accountability than does agenda-setting. Here, representation of
issues and interests is important to ensure organizational accountability
to its membership, and in some cases, its beneficiaries.
3. General Participation and Lobbying
The most widely recognized role of NGO participation in international
governance is one of lobbyist.102 NGOs are renowned for their ability to
mobilize public awareness and opinion and catalyze action on particular
issues.103 This differs from the agenda-setting function insofar as NGOs
do not have the right to set the agenda, but due to the force of NGO lobbying, issues are placed upon the agenda by other governance actors.
Examples of NGO influence, both positive and negative, in international governance abound. NGO pressure is widely recognized as catalyzing the formation of the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation (NACEC) under the North American Free Trade

THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 83 (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000); see WORLD
COMM’N ON DAMS (WCD), PROJECT AND FINANCIAL REPORT (2001), available at http://
www.damsreport.org/docs/wcdfinrpt.pdf. The WCD was replaced by the Dams and Development Program in September 2001.
99. Khagram, supra note 98, at 83. The WCD was established in 1998 under the
sponsorship of the World Bank and the IUCN. WCD, Outline of the WCD: Introduction,
http://www.dams.org/commission/intro.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2005).
100. See generally Kader Asmal, Introduction: World Commission on Dams Report,
Dams and Development, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1411 (2001).
101. See WCD, supra note 98, at 2 (“Many felt that the contested nature of the dams
debate would pull the Commission apart.”); id. at 26 (“The multi-stakeholder process
followed by the Commission led to recommendations for a new way forward that no
single perspective could advocate on its own.”).
102. Simon Zadek and Murdoch Gatward, Transforming the Transnational NGOs:
Social Auditing or Bust?, in BEYOND THE MAGIC BULLET, supra note 30, at 227.
103. Ann Marie Clark, Non-Governmental Organizations and their Influence on International Society, 48 J. INT’L AFF. 507, 510 (1995); Nancy Lindborg, Nongovernmental
Organizations: Their Past, Present, and Future Role in International Environmental
Negotiations, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY MAKING 5 (Lawrence Susskind et al. eds., 1992).

2005]

NGO ACCOUNTABILITY CONCERNS

165

Agreement (NAFTA),104 for dismantling negotiations of the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment,105 and for assisting in the creation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Landmines.106 Like the
Kosovo Transition Council, which was comprised of political parties,
religious leaders, and representatives of ethnic minorities, these international governance discussions afforded NGOs the opportunity to influence State action, without providing any real political power to the
NGOs.107 The impact of NGO involvement in such lobbying situations
depends upon the willingness of both the governance regime and the
governance actors within the regime to listen to and adopt NGO positions.
Lobbying activities are another political governance function which
counsels unique accountability controls. Lobbying may or may not imply
a sense of representation of affected persons, which may counsel external
accountability to NGO beneficiaries, may only require internal accountability to ensure adequate member interest representation, or may require
no representativeness, depending upon the issue and the purpose with
which the NGO claims to act. There is little need, however, for external
accountability to the regime, apart from perhaps ensuring participating
NGOs do not knowingly provide false information or omit information,
as the organization can dismiss NGO arguments quite readily.108

104. PIERRE MARC JOHNSON & ANDRÉ BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA:
UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 2 (1996); Fredric
Menz, An Environmental Policy for North America Post-NAFTA, NO. AM. OUTLOOK,
Mar. 1994, at 11.
105. See generally Rodney Bruce Hall, Private Authority: Non-State Actors and
Global Governance, 27 HARV. INTL. REV. 2 (2005).
106. Jost Delbrück, Exercising Public Authority Beyond the State: Transnational Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29,
41 (2003); Steve Charnovitz, The Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global
Governance (Paris, 1919), 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 45, 54 n.30 (2003).
107. See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ICG BALKANS REPORT NO. 100: KOSOVO REPORT CARD
28 (2000); INT’L CRISIS GROUP, ICG BALKANS REPORT NO. 97, ELECTIONS IN KOSOVO:
MOVING TOWARD DEMOCRACY? 2 (2000).
108. The circumstances surrounding the dismissal of NGO arguments may affect, either positively or negatively, the perceived legitimacy of the governance regime. Therefore, dismissal may not be so readily done for political reasons. However, the power to
dismiss arguments does exist and can be exercised, especially if the regime’s legitimacy
is high.
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B. Administrative Duties
Administrative duties differ from political activities because ruleimplementation is the function, rather than rule-setting. As noted above,
NGO participation in rule-implementation is somewhat minimal, though
less so than in rule-setting activities.109 These governance functions have
come to being as international organizations and networks have sought to
regulate behavior, rather than simply establish norms to be implemented
at the national level. This specificity has necessitated a more complex
governance structure, and as a result of institutional or systemic capacities, has sometimes involved NGOs in the implementation of such regimes.
The literature on NGO participation in international governance has
focused little on NGOs acting in an administrative capacity. It is appropriate, however, to distinguish democratic and delegatory models of governance.110 NGOs performing the functions of a typical administrative
agency in the domestic context have authority delegated to them by the
international regime and therefore must be accountable to the regime.
Questions regarding democratic representativeness of the NGOs themselves are less important, as proceduralizing the actions of agencies is the
dominant accountability control applied in such circumstances, not the
assurance of direct representation. However, greater representation is
increasingly sought in administrative actions, though typically limited to
the role of lobbyists or Advisory Councils, so concerns regarding representation may surface to a greater extent in the future.
1. Certification
A powerful role NGOs may play in the administration of international
governance is certification of actors for participation in the regime itself.
The power to enable participation is significant.111 While this Article
suggests a shared role in such an accreditation process between the regime, the State hosting the applicant organization, and an independent
NGO dedicated to certification issues,112 such a system is not always existent.
For instance, the Framework Convention on Climate Change, under
which the Kyoto Protocol on climate change operates, provides the op109. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
110. See generally Grant & Keohane, supra note 4.
111. See Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT’L L. 183, 283 (1997).
112. See infra Part IV.C.5.
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portunity for NGO participation as a certification body, without significant co-regulation by the regime, though delegation authority is retained
by the regime. Article 7.2(a) of the Convention provides the possibility
NGOs may contract with the Conference of the Parties, where appropriate, to supervise and implement the Convention.113 Article 12.4 provides
the Conference of Parties with a clear mandate to establish guidelines for
the certification of carbon sequestration and other projects under the
Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM).114 Article 12.9 gives the Executive Board authority to provide guidance on participation of various
stakeholders, both governmental and non-governmental, in that certification process.115 The Board, as well as its “operational entities,” which
may include NGOs, could become a further compliance enforcement
mechanism under the CDM.116 As a result, Article 7.2(a) may provide
NGOs the opportunity to act in an implementing role in the CDM.117
Here, the accountability issues relating to NGO involvement as certification entities are complex. External accountability to the regime is important, but excessive accountability to the regime might undermine the
expression of, or adherence to, stakeholder interests which the CDM
113. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 7.2(a), May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. Additional opportunities for non-State
participation in the Kyoto Protocol were also suggested for consideration, but have not
yet come to fruition. See Chiara Giorgetti, From Rio to Kyoto: A Study of the Involvement
of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Negotiations on Climate Change, 7 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 201, 213 (1999). See also Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and
Technological Advice, UNFCCC, 2d Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 7, at 11, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/SBSTA/1996/4 (Feb. 2, 1996) [hereinafter Subsidiary Body Report] (pushing the
consideration of greater NGO participation). Since most of the proposed requirements
depend upon host country implementation, as opposed to the CDM administrative structure, they are not addressed in this Article. Id. at 6. See also Peggy Rodgers Kalas &
Alexia Herwig, Dispute Resolution Under the Kyoto Protocol, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 53, 128
(2000) (“Where dispute settlement regimes and international tribunals deny access to
non-State actors, the ability of domestic courts to decide disputes under international law
and to enforce their decisions domestically is particularly salient.”).
114. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
art. 12.4, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, 38 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]. The CDM
authorizes developed countries to purchase carbon sinks and other nature-preserving or
enhancing projects in order to decrease their total greenhouse gas emissions and achieve
their greenhouse gas reduction targets.
115. Id. art. 12.9.
116. See Catherine Regdwell, Non-Compliance Procedures and the Climate Change
Convention, in GLOBAL ENV’T INFO. CTR., GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: INTERLINKAGES BETWEEN THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND OTHER MULTILATERAL REGIMES ch. 3, at
22 (1998), available at http://www.geic.or.jp/climgov/03.pdf.
117. See supra text accompanying note 113.
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seeks to support.118 Despite this, internal representation seems of little
importance, as does external accountability to beneficiaries, since such
representation would disfavor other relevant interests.
2. Standard Setting
NGOs are involved on a somewhat limited basis in actual standard setting in the administrative context. However, where NGOs do have such
authority, the power they wield is tremendous. While the majority of
scholars treating this subject focus on private standards (adopted later by
international regimes, domestic governments, or industry),119 this Article
deals only with those standards established by NGOs through a public
international governance system. While limited in its analysis, this Article does not agree with most scholars who posit that the International
Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) standards are completely informal and private. Instead, this Article views ISO as somewhere between wholly informal and formal, since its members come from national standards bodies,120 but are not exclusively comprised of government entities.121 For instance, the American National Standards Institute,
a member of ISO, is comprised of government and non-governmental

118. UNFCCC, supra note 113, art. 4.1(i).
119. See, e.g., Colin Scott, Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected Facet
of Contemporary Governance, 29 J. LAW & SOC’Y 56, 74 (2002) (“[Many] non-statutory
private regulators operate complete regimes in the sense of having the capacity to set
standards, to monitor and enforce without the intervention of other organizations. Where
this is the case, they wield more power than those public regulators which are constrained
by the need to follow standards set by legislatures or government departments and to
pursue litigation in order to apply legal sanctions. There is thus a remarkable concentration of private power over public organizations. This is perhaps most striking with those
private regulators operating internationally whose judgments on such matters as financial
or fiscal credibility, probity or greenness significantly affect decisions of notionally democratic governments.”). See also Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities
and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. NO. 1, at 1 (1992). Such regulation
may be desirable to promote international harmonization, make transactions more secure,
avoid harsher command-and-control type regulation, or to respond to market accountability forces. See Virginia Haufler, Private Sector International Regimes, in NON-STATE
ACTORS AND AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 121, 127 (Richard A. Higgott et al. eds.,
2000).
120. See JAMES R. EVANS & WILLIAM M. LINDSAY, THE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
OF QUALITY 488 (3d ed. 1996). See also Karstin Ronit & Volker Schneider, Global Governance Through Private Organizations, 12 GOVERNANCE 243 (1999).
121. Haufler, supra note 119, at 127.
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organizations.122 Therefore, this Article views the ISO standards as nonbinding standards created through public-private partnerships and therefore within the purview of this Article.
A more powerful example of NGO involvement in standard-setting,
however, is the International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO, an
inter-governmental organization designed to protect workers from exploitation and poor working conditions, provides a role for NGOs, primarily trade unions, in standard-setting.123 For example, NGOs worked
as members of the ILO to pass the ILO Minimum Age Convention No.
138 regarding child labor.124 This Convention has been ratified by approximately 141 countries, some of which have a history of using very
young child labor.125 The actual impact NGOs have on the content of
these standards is uncertain.126 However, State delegations include four
members: two representatives from government, one representative of
employer interests, and one representative of worker interests.127 Each
delegate is provided an individual right to vote, so NGO votes do matter.128
While many of the ILO’s standards are non-binding recommendations,
including codes of conduct, resolutions, and declarations, these standards

122. Lee A. Tavis, Corporate Governance and the Global Social Void, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 487, 506–07 (2002).
123. See About the ILO, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/index.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
124. ILO Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment
(C138), June 26, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 297. See also ILO, Subregional Office for Southern Africa: SRO-Harare, Child Labour: Background Paper, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/afpro/mdtharare/about/childlabour.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2005)
(“As is the case with all ILO standards, Convention No. 138 is the outcome of a tripartite
standard setting procedure, involving Governments, as well as Employers’ and Workers’
Organizations.”).
125. See ILO: ILOLEX Database on International Labour Standards, http://www.ilo.
org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C138 (last visited Aug. 20, 2005); Frank René López, Corporate Social Responsibility in a Global Economy After September 11: Profits, Freedom,
and Human Rights, 55 MERCER L. REV. 739, 774 (2004) (noting how many countries
have ratified various ILO conventions); BUREAU OF INT’L LABOR AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, BY THE SWEAT AND TOIL OF CHILDREN: EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE CHILD LABOR, ch.
III, tbl. III-1 (1998), http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/iclp/sweat5/toc.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2005).
126. See Börzel & Risse, supra note 82, at 202–03; Charnovitz, supra note 111, at
216–19.
127. Constitution of the International Labour Organization art. 3, para. 1, June 28,
1919, available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/iloconst.htm.
128. See id. art. 4, para. 1.
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do have the weight of “soft law.”129 Disputes regarding the definition of
many of these voluntary standards are interpreted by the ILO.130 The ILO
is also involved in the creation of treaties, which establish binding labor
and workplace standards, though its role is largely limited to lobbying
and agenda-setting in treaty formulation.131
While the ILO is not the only body establishing international corporate
codes of conduct, it is the most influential source of “soft law” regarding
labor and workplace standards and has the unique ability to enforce its
codes.132 As a result, accountability is important to ensure proper NGO
participation in the ILO standard-setting. While the level of external accountability to the regime is less important when the regime can ensure
countervailing interests are represented in the standard-setting process,
external accountability to beneficiaries and internal accountability to
members may be important to ensure a fair and balanced standard-setting
process.
3. Training and Information Provision
Training administrators and others is a well-known role of NGOs in international governance. Capacity-building organizations working with
the UN Development Programme, for instance, focus on interorganizational learning and training,133 serve as experts to governance
actors,134 and gather information. These NGOs often act in an advisory
capacity for international governance regimes, serving as “epistemic

129. See, e.g., Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, adopted by Governing Body of the International Labour Office,
International Labour Organization, 204th Sess. (1977), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
standards/norm/sources/mne.htm#added, revised, Codes of Practice, International Labour
Organization (2002), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/norm/sources/codes.
htm. See generally Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Role of Soft Law in a Global Order, in
COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 100, 100–14 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000).
130. See Doh & Guay, supra note 82, at 11.
131. See About the ILO, supra note 123.
132. See Doh & Guay, supra note 82, at 11–12, 18 (discussing the OECD 1976 Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which was revised in 2000 to allow NGO consultation, and the Global Compact, which provides an NGO role in monitoring compliance).
133. See Brown et al., supra note 60, at 18.
134. L.E. SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY: NEGOTIATING MORE EFFECTIVE
GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 49–53 (1994); Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PENN J. INT’L ECON. L. 331,
335–39 (1996).
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communities” in policy formulation.135 In fact, “[s]ince 1993, the number
of states that have appealed to NGOs as ad hoc experts in procedures and
development of international agreements has increased tremendously.”136
The United States, for instance, incorporates NGOs into international
policy making through the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),
which provides a role for NGOs to advise United States representatives
on international policy issues and ensure appointments to federal committees are “fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented.”137 While the participation of NGOs as members of a policy Advisory Council is limited and controlled by other governance actors, usually State delegations,138 such participation, when it does occur, can be
quite influential.139 Indeed, these committees have often engaged in important international regulatory negotiations, also known as “reg-neg.” It
has even been claimed NGO advisors determine much of World Bank
policy.140
The UN system of Working Groups is probably the best example of the
involvement of NGOs in Advisory Councils. Working Groups are commissioned to review technical details of a proposal or provide information and guidance in relationships with particular groups, including indigenous communities, women, children, and others.141 While these

135. See generally Haas, supra note 119.
136. Mariella Pandolfi, Contract of Mutual (In)Difference: Governance and the Humanitarian Apparatus in Contemporary Albania and Kosovo, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 369, 372 (2003).
137. 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 5, 10 (1972). See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 5843 (2001). See also Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 173 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 1999); Press Release, Earthjustice, Federal Court Orders Bush Administration to Add Environmental Representative to Chemical Trade Advisory Panel (Jan. 21, 2003), http://www.earthjustice.org/news/display.
html?ID=531.
138. For instance, the chair of any advisory committee is usually a government representative who has the authority to choose representatives. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 5843
(2001). Further, all interests need not be represented equally to meet the FACA. 60
Comp. Gen. 386, 387 (1981).
139. See Charles C. Caldart & Nicholas A. Ashford, Negotiation as a Means of Developing and Implementing Environmental and Occupational Health and Safety Policy, 23
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 141, 143–44, 164 (1999) (discussing an OSHA advisory committee’s negotiated rulemaking for coke oven emissions and noting that often such negotiated rulemaking occurred under the auspices of the FACA).
140. See Citizen’s Groups: The Non-governmental Order, ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 1999,
at 20, 21 (“From environmental policy to debt relief, NGOs are at the centre of World
Bank policy. Often they determine it.”).
141. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Homepage, http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues.index.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2005); Office
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Working Groups operate outside the purview of official UN policy making circles, they report to various UN committees and have substantial
legitimacy.142 Membership on these Working Groups is therefore highly
prestigious, especially since Working Groups are treated as insiders in
the UN system, are accorded significant access privileges, and may wield
significant power as expert bodies. The level of Working Group influence varies by committee and issue, but can be quite powerful and frame
entire negotiation processes, formulate draft texts, or even reject negotiated solutions.143
In the case of Advisory Councils or training activities, the accountability question is about who has the right to provide information or be
treated as experts. There are also questions related to the quality of the
information provided. All of these concerns tend toward issues of competence, rather than issues of representation. Accordingly, participation
in Advisory Councils represents a functionalist approach to international
governance and must be cordoned through delegatory models of accountability.
For accountability purposes, this is the least problematic of the administrative functions an NGO may perform. Accountability concerns focus
mainly around the production and content of information, ensuring the
information is full, fair, and accurate.144 As such, training and information is supposed to be largely objective, and concerns about representativeness are limited. More important is external accountability to the organization to ensure it is not misled by the NGO providing the information.
4. Service Provision
Some authors have categorized NGOs partially by function, classifying
them as operational- or advocacy-oriented.145 However, the classification
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 27: Seventeen Frequently Asked Questions about United Nations Special Rapporteurs, available at
http://www.hri/ca/fortherecordCanada/documentation/other/ftsheet27.htm (last visited
Oct. 12, 2005); Working Group on Indigenous Populations Homepage, http://www.
unhchr.ch/indigenous/mandate.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2005).
142. See Fact Sheet No. 27, supra note 141.
143. See, e.g., Lori A. Nessel, “Willful Blindness” to Gender-Based Violence Abroad:
United States’ Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations Convention Against
Torture, 89 MINN. L. REV. 71, 90 n.72 (2004) (noting the involvement of a Working
Group in the formulation of the Convention Against Torture).
144. See Wapner, supra note 50, at 203.
145. Leon Gordeneker & Thomas G. Weiss, Pluralizing Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions, in NGOS, THE UN, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 36–40
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of NGOs as operational is limited primarily to the deployment of services.146 While the preceding sections have illustrated howNGO involvement in the enforcement of international governance systems extends beyond the simple deployment of services, service provision by far
constitutes the main avenue of NGO participation in the enforcement and
furtherance of international governance systems.147
NGOs are good actors in this capacity as they are generally more responsive to beneficiary needs than government institutions. However,
they may be less accountable than government institutions in the delivery
of those services.148 In fact,
[i]t’s not as if there is a long list of parties able to deliver medical aid in
Chechnya, or run refugee camps in Congo, or vaccinate children in
southern Sudan. Whatever the rest of their political agendas, international NGOs are often not only the best positioned to do these jobs,
they are the only organizations with any possibility of doing them.149

It is often argued NGOs are best able to provide development assistance and non-profit services such as community health care and the
management of natural resources150—especially for populations unable
to pay since they do not fall neatly within any particular category ser(Leon Gordeneker & Thomas G. Weiss eds., 1996); P. van Tuijl, NGOs and Human
Rights: Sources of Justice and Democracy, 5 J. INT’L AFF. 493 (1999).
146. See Doh & Guay, supra note 82, at 3.
147. In fact, sixty-seven percent of European Union (EU) aid and five percent of Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) development aid goes
directly to NGOs for the provision of services. See NGOs: Sins of the Secular Missionaries, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 25 (noting the EU’s development aid figures); Edwards
& David Hulme, Introduction: NGO Performance and Accountability, in BEYOND THE
MAGIC BULLET, supra note 30, at 3. See also Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public
Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000). NGOs assuming public functions through contract have received significant attention from scholars, who fear the blurring of lines between the public and the private. See, e.g., Anthony
Bebbington & John Farrington, Governments, NGOs and Agricultural Development:
Perspectives on Changing Inter-Organisational Relationships, 29 J. DEV. STUD. 199,
212–14 (1993) (Eng.) (discussing the potentially problematic consequences of NGOs’
expanding roles within private and public institutions). See also Aman, supra note 39, at
1704–08.
148. See generally STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH & MICHAEL LIPSKY, NON-PROFITS FOR
HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN AN AGE OF CONTRACTING (1993).
149. Anderson, supra note 3, at 375.
150. See, e.g., Zadek & Gatward, supra note 102, at 229–39; Goodin, supra note 5, at
3–4; J. Fisher, Is the Iron Law of Oligarchy Rusting Away in the Third World?, 22
WORLD DEV. 129 (1994) (Can.).
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viceable by the government.151 This view is generally held because selfselection of personnel and NGO purpose statements serve to create organizations with officers having altruistic motivations, giving greater
assurance they will carry out the provision of public goods and other
public interested actions with less rent-seeking relative to other organizations.152
However, when non-profits compete for public contracts with forprofit entities, the competitive process may cause non-profits to act similarly to for-profit entities.153 Despite this concern, “[s]ervice providers
accrue government funding largely on the basis of client choices rather
than on the basis of competitive tendering for contracts providing blocks
of funding from government.”154 Additionally, when acting as contract
agents, NGOs generally have performance requirements built into the
public service contracts.155 This illustrates a distinct subject of accountability: results- or outcome-based accountability. Principal-agent accountability issues are also raised when NGOs provide services. In such
arrangements, NGOs are held externally accountable by the governments
or international governmental organizations with whom they contract,156
and by the beneficiaries who seek to ensure the services fulfill their
needs, and internally accountable by their members, who determine the
manner through which the services are provided.
5. Other Administrative Functions
NGOs might also perform other, more difficult to categorize, administrative functions. For instance, the World Conservation Monitoring Unit
compiled State data on trade in endangered species and prepared reports
regarding such data, implementing the Convention on International

151. See SMITH & LIPSKY, supra note 148, ch. 6.
152. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 21–22.
153. See id. at 3. See also Brown et al., supra note 60, at 16–17.
154. Goodin, supra note 5, at 42. However, competitive bidding processes do exist in a
number of circumstances. See id.
155. Id. at 31.
156. See generally Richard Mulgan, Contracting Out and Accountability, 56 AUSTL. J.
PUB. ADMIN. 106 (1997); Elizabeth Palmer, Should Public Health Be a Private Concern?
Developing a Public Service Paradigm in English Law, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 663
(2002); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003); Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of ThirdParty Government, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE
523 (Lester M. Salmon & Odus V. Elliott eds., 2002).
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Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).157 Though taking a more involved
administrative role, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) has taken on similar duties. ICANN allocates and
assigns internet space, manages top-level domain names (e.g., .com, .org,
and other generic and country-code top level domains), and manages root
servers. Although ICANN is largely considered the provision of private
standards, domestic governments are involved in the process of establishing the standards, thereby making the process a quasi-public-private
partnership.158 Accountability for these administrative activities will depend upon the functions performed, but is expected to be primarily based
on external accountability controls to the regime, with minimal representational concerns or internal mechanisms needed.
C. Enforcement
While the involvement of NGOs in standard setting and general administrative duties of international organizations is currently relatively low
(though likely to increase in the future), NGO involvement in the enforcement of established codes has been characterized as moderate in
scope and nature.159
1. Arbitration and Mediation
Private arbitration is a major way international regimes are enforced.
Many international treaties and regimes provide the opportunity for litigants to pursue arbitration as either the sole remedy or one of a litany of
potential remedies for violation of provisions of those instruments.160 The
leading international arbitration organization providing for the settlement
of these disputes is the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),161 which is an “autonomous international organi-

157. See Edith Brown Weiss, The Five International Treaties: A Living History, in
ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 89, 109–11 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998).
158. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 4.
159. See Doh & Guay, supra note 82, at 10 tbl.1.
160. See Joanne K. Leweler, International Commercial Arbitration as a Model for
Resolving Treaty Disputes, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 379 (1989).
161. See generally Amazu A. Asouzu, African States and the Enforcement of Arbitral
Awards: Some Key Issues, 15 ARB. INT’L 1 (1999); Thomas L. Brewer, International
Investment Dispute Settlement Procedures: The Evolving Regime for Foreign Direct
Investment, 26 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 633 (1995); A. Giardina, ICSID: A Self-Contained,
Non-National Review System, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
TOWARDS “JUDICIALIZATION” AND UNIFORMITY? 199 (R.B. Lillich & C.N. Brower eds.,
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zation” established by the World Bank through an international convention and comprised of World Bank Member States.162 However, other
arbitral NGOs also serve to enforce international regimes. For instance,
the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration hears more than 500 new cases each year. Having heard over 12,000
cases since its inception in 1923,163 the Court is responsible for hearing
many of the arbitrations arising under the UN Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).164 Similarly, the American Arbitration
Association, operating under the International Dispute Resolution Procedures, also hears cases dealing with international governance issues.165
Questions about accountability are particularly poignant when NGOs
take on the role of mediating or arbitrating disputes. External accountability to the governance regime and NGO independence are important.
Internal accountability or external accountability to its beneficiaries may
be seen as biased and would be largely undesirable.166 However, some
measure of external accountability to beneficiaries (and the regime itself)
may be important in certain contexts where the governing rules require
consideration of civil society’s participatory needs in dispute resolution.
2. Monitoring
167

Although untested, some claim under specific conditions, NGO lobbying and information provision can pressure norm-violating govern1994); Carolyn B. Lamm, Jurisdiction of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 6 ICSID REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 462 (1991); G.R. Delaume,
ICSID Arbitration, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 23
(Julian D. M. Lew ed., 1987); C.F. Amerasinghe, The Jurisdiction of the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 19 INDIAN J. INT’L L. 166 (1979).
162. About ICSID, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/about/about.htm (last visited July
29, 2005). See also Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, Oct. 14, 1996, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
163. See What is ICC?, http://www.iccwbo.org/home/menu_what_is_icc.asp (last visited July 29, 2005); Introducing ICC Dispute Resolution Services, http://www.
iccwbo.org/court/english/intro_court/introduction.asp (last visited July 29, 2005).
164. For some of the various arbitral rules adopted by UNCITRAL, see the Report of
the Working Group on Arbitration on the work of its thirty-sixth session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/508, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/V02/533/86/PDF/
V0253386.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Aug. 19, 2005).
165. See also About Us, http://www.adr.org/About; International Dispute Resolution
Procedures (2003), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22090 (last visited Oct.
13, 2005).
166. However, some concerns may be addressed if the impropriety of NGO actions
affects its status in future dealings.
167. See Brühl, supra note 16, at 378–79.
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ments into compliance.168 However, it is not clear whether NGOs undertaking these approaches actually influence State behavior.169 While it has
been noted most NGOs are not well-suited to serve as comprehensive
and exclusive enforcement agents,170 NGOs have nevertheless been provided the authority in some regimes to act as enforcement agents where
States are believed to have violated international rules.171
For instance, under the Montreal Protocol, NGOs may act as enforcement agents by notifying the Secretariat of non-conforming States, who
in turn may sanction the non-conforming States.172 Although NGOs need
not show injury to enforce the regime, they do not have substantive
rights under the Montreal Protocol, and Parties must consent to NGO
participation, limiting the effectiveness of NGO enforcement significantly.173 Conversely, under a number of human rights regimes, NGOs
are granted locus standi to enforce human rights instruments.174 As a result, “the regular provision of information by the [international NGO]
community to various UN human rights committees and national governments has not only greatly improved our knowledge about human
rights violations, but also increased compliance with international human
rights norms.”175
168. See generally THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND
DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
169. See Chandler, supra note 19, at 335–36.
170. See Ruth Mayne, Regulating TNCs: The Role of Voluntary and Governmental
Approaches, in REGULATING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: BEYOND LIBERALIZATION 235
(Sol Picciotto & Ruth Mayne eds., 1999).
171. See generally Paul Wapner, Politics Beyond the State: Environmental Activism
and World Civic Politics, 47 WORLD POL. 311 (1995).
172. See Brühl, supra note 16, at 373. See also Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer art. 11(5), Annex III, para. 1, Annex IV(10), Sept. 16, 1987,
1522 U.N.T.S. 3, 26 I.L.M. 1541, adjusted by London Amendments, June 29, 1990, 20
I.L.M. 537, Nairobi Amendments, June 21, 1991, and Copenhagen Amendments, Nov.
23–25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 874; Report of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Envtl. Programme, U.N.
Doc. EP/OzL.Pro. 2/3 (1990), available at http:www.unep.org/ozone/Meeting_Document/mop/02mop/MOP_2.asp_cph.htm.
173. See Kalas & Herwig, supra note 113, at 132; Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown, Building a Monitoring and Compliance Regime Under the Montreal Protocol, 16 YALE J.
INT’L L. 519, 564 (1991).
174. See, e.g., Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, art.
23, http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic18.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2005). See also William J. Aceves, Actio Popularis? The Class Action in International Law, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 353 (2003).
175. Börzel & Risse, supra note 82, at 209, citing THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE (Thomas Risse et. al eds., 1999).
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Other, weaker versions of NGO participation as monitoring and enforcement agents also exist. For instance, NGOs can participate in the
WTO dispute settlement system through submission of amicus curiae
briefs.176 Though this is a relatively weak method of enforcement, what
is important about the WTO example is, in order to submit a brief, the
organization must make clear its objectives, affiliations, funding sources,
and plan for uniquely contributing to the resolution of the dispute.177
Allowing NGOs to participate in the monitoring and enforcement of
international regimes raises different accountability concerns than does
the situation where an NGO acts as the mediator or arbitrator in a dispute
concerning such violations. Similar to the previous discussion, NGOs
must remain accountable to the regime itself, ensuring NGOs constrain
their charges of States violating international norms to instances where
the NGOs actually believe such violations to exist. More significant
however, is the importance of NGOs to adequately represent those interests for which they claim to stand. If the enforcement scheme is designed
to leave vindication of the rights of unrepresented or disempowered
groups to NGOs, then it is essential NGOs be accountable to their beneficiaries. Internal accountability in this circumstance is only marginally
important to the proper functioning of the regime.
The question then remains as it began: are NGOs sufficiently accountable to the appropriate entities or populations? The following Part answers this question generally in the negative and seeks to apply a function-based analysis to NGO accountability theory.
IV. REFINING THE CRITIQUE: GUIDING NGO INVOLVEMENT
The previous Part illustrated some of the distinct accountability concerns related to particular functions performed by NGOs in international
governance. This function-based approach to categorizing NGOs is not
unique to this Article. Börzel and Risse categorize NGOs by function and
their source of authority in international governance systems, noting
NGOs can perform various functions within governance systems based
upon cooptation, delegation, co-regulation, or self-regulation in the
176. Esty, supra note 97, at 11. This has been discussed in significant detail by other
scholars and will not be reiterated here. See, e.g., Jacqueline Peel, Giving the Public a
Voice in the Protection of the Global Environment: Avenues for Participation by NGOs
in Dispute Resolution at the European Court of Justice and World Trade Organization,
12 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 47, 63–64 (2001).
177. See World Trade Organization, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with
Non-Governmental Organizations, WTO/L/162 (July 18, 1996), available at http://www.
wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/guide_e.htm.
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shadow of hierarchy.178 This authority-based analysis is useful in understanding the context within which NGO governance functions occur.
However, it is only useful in establishing accountability controls insofar
as they assist policy makers in determining the needs and purposes of the
organization itself.
Although recognition of the source of authority may legitimate NGO
involvement under some governance systems and not others, such a
framework does not suggest differentiated accountability controls when
the same function is performed across different governance systems.
Rather, differentiation is a function of the overall regime needs and purposes with respect to NGO participation and may significantly vary by
type of governance regime. As a result, the authority-based analysis performed by Börzel and Risse is part of a separate accountability analysis
and should be treated as an addendum to, but not a replacement of, the
framework established by this Article. This Part seeks to define some of
the major issues and parameters involved in establishing a functionbased accountability control system.
The UN system has the clearest and most direct method of ensuring the
accountability of NGOs seeking to participate in governance activities.179
The 1996 policy established under the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) grants “consultative status” to NGOs upon a demonstration
of purpose and accountability.180 While this “consultative status” does
not grant NGOs the right to participate in all functions of governance
described above in Part III, the procedure used by ECOSOC to accredit
participation is a useful starting point for a discussion of NGO accountability requirements. The ECOSOC procedures require NGOs to provide
their charters, bylaws, financial statements, annual reports, sample publications, and explain how their participation will contribute to the goals of
the UN.181 These requirements are needed to evaluate NGOs’ structure,
internal (public) accountability, and external accountability through
funding sources.182 From the application, ECOSOC determines which
NGOs may participate, limiting involvement to those having expertise in

178. Börzel & Risse, supra note 82, at 200.
179. Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental
Organizations, ECOSOC Res. 1996/31, U.N. Doc E/RES/1996/31 (June 25, 1996), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/eres1996-31.htm [hereinafter
ECOSOC Procedures].
180. Id.
181. Id. ¶¶ 10–13, 21.
182. Id.
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the particular matter.183 Once accredited, NGOs can maintain their “consultative status” by submitting a four-page, double-sided report every
four years.184 Though this requirement may be criticized as insufficient to
ensure accountability, the consultative process generally enables international organizations to assert external accountability controls on NGOs,
thereby minimizing “non-cooperative behavior.”185
While the UN procedures signify a step in the right direction, there are
over 6,400 intergovernmental organizations with which NGOs might
engage and very few of them have similar accountability procedures.186
Additionally, the ECOSOC requirements “need to be reconsidered in
light of the increasing number of NGOs.”187 While providing a good
starting framework, the ECOSOC procedures do not deal with the many
variations of international governance activities in which an NGO might
participate and are limited to the very narrow “consultative status” akin
to participation on the Advisory Councils discussed above in Part III.B.3.
Furthermore, the ECOSOC procedures conflate internal accountability
with external accountability to the beneficiaries of the NGO.188 While
this creates a significant concern for some governance functions, it
clearly demonstrates a failing of the ECOSOC procedures to separate
their requirements based upon the functions performed by the NGO. For
example, Advisory Councils are highly technocratic epistemic communities designed around expertise.189 It is therefore not clear why internal
accountability or external accountability to beneficiaries is particularly
important to performing the governance function. On the other hand,
where “consultative status” implies the right to act as an observer and
participant in UN policy making procedures, the necessity and appropriateness of such representation is far greater. The ECOSOC procedures do
not distinguish between these two types of NGOs in terms of qualifications to perform various governance functions, illustrating how accountability controls not tailored to function are simultaneously both over- and
under-inclusive.

183. Id. ¶ 9.
184. Id. ¶¶ 55, 61(c).
185. Börzel & Risse, supra note 82, at 201.
186. See 2004/2005 5 Y.B. INT’L ORGS. 3 (Union of Int’l Assocs. ed., 41st ed.).
187. Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of International Law?, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 345, 358 (2000) (arguing for application of the Sullivan Principles for accountability); Sullivan Principles for U.S. Corporations Operating in South Africa, 24 I.L.M. 1464,
1496 (1985).
188. See ECOSOC Procedures, supra note 179, ¶ 12.
189. See Haas, supra note 119, at 3.
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Although this Article proceeds primarily from an institutional perspective, similar issues are raised in network governance structures, since
“network governance representation is at least partly defined in functional terms.”190 Additionally, even in a network situation,
the relationship between representatives and represented has to conform to norms that usually are established in an institutional framework
. . . establish[ing] rules which determine the selection of representatives, and [those institutions] have to create formal structures of communication and control, in which rulers can be effectively hold [sic] accountable for their decisions.191

As a result, this Article agrees although the process may be somewhat
distinct and the accountability needs of network governance structures
somewhat different than traditional institutional governance structures,
“from a normative point of view, institutional structures of governance
are decisive for democratic legitimacy, and this holds true for network
governance, too.”192 In fact, given “[g]overnance networks . . . serve as a
corrective for deficits of the institutions,”193 creating distinctions in accountability requirements for networks as opposed to institutions seems
normatively suspect.194
This Part seeks to assist international governance regimes in defining
the universe of NGOs eligible to perform a particular governance function. It is not, however, intended to determine whether NGOs should perform a function or which particular NGO or NGOs should be selected to
perform particular functions. “[T]he essential differences between various types of NGO activity seem to warrant some kind of typology, some
way of grouping NGOs by the functions they perform.”195 Grouping organizations by function “would, at a minimum, allow us to approach an
individual NGO on its own terms, evaluating the particular organization

190. See Benz & Papadopoulos, supra note 73, at 2.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 3.
194. This issue has significant nuances, including considerations of whether networks
increase or decrease institutional ability to perform and maintain its own accountability.
See id. at 4–5. These relational issues have not been analyzed to an extent sufficient for
the author to conclude whether networks should be held to significantly different forms
or extents of accountability control than traditional institutions.
195. Spar & Dail, supra note 30, at 173 (suggesting classifying NGO activities similar
to the Standard Industrial Trade Classification system).
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with regard to its specific purpose.”196 In evaluating NGOs for base accountability purposes, three major types of accountability exist: (1) intentions or purposes; (2) actions or competence; and (3) outcomes.197 Given
the resource constraints and distance of international regimes from
NGOs, this Article suggests accountability controls be established at both
the international and national levels.
A. Standardizing Procedures by Function
At the national level, function-based accountability controls are especially crucial to achieving the appropriate level of NGO accountability.
At the international level, this need is accentuated by the lack of institutional regime capacity or experience in providing the ever-expanding
range of international governance functions, necessitating the inclusion
of NGOs and other non-State actors in international governance—a need
less significant at the national level. As a result, there is no significant
normative difference (putting aside the democratic deficit debate) between international and domestic governance to warrant different approaches to determining when accountability mechanisms should be applied. However, NGO participation in domestic governance may be far
more limited in the scope of roles performed, making a function-based
approach not economically feasible.198
A function-based approach is particularly important for NGOs because,
although it is assumed NGO officials are typically more altruistic than
other governance actors (with the possible exception of government officials), “[domestic] non-profit corporate law is in any event unlikely in
any jurisdiction to constrain NGO executives to the extent that public
officials routinely are constrained by ethics legislation and regulations.”199 While NGOs may have a lower starting baseline of accountability (given existing frameworks), this does not mean we should demand greater total accountability of NGOs than of other governance actors.

196. Id. at 174. The classification system proposed by Spar and Dail would include
outcome-based accountability mechanisms involving cross-comparisons. Id. This would
enhance competition between NGOs and speaks to the competence issue, but is overly
broad in its analysis. Such outcome-based accountability mechanisms are not appropriate
in every situation where NGOs perform some governance function.
197. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 10–11.
198. See Benz & Papadopolous, supra note 73, at 10–11.
199. Spiro, supra note 21, at 963.
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As noted above, traditional theory relates the strength of accountability
relationships to “the power of the entity being held accountable.”200
While significantly different from the view of accountability in this Article, its basic premise is implicitly applicable to the project set out here.
In fact, “with respect to legitimacy, the nature of the issue may be an important factor in determining whether we care about procedures for accountability.”201 If power is determined in part by function, as this Article posits, then accountability controls and their strengths should be
mapped to those functions. This section seeks to undertake such an effort, moving away from the mainstream literature which aligns accountability mechanisms with type of governance actor or regime.202 The following sections attempt to map broadly political-, administrative-, and
enforcement-related functions to accountability controls analyzed by
others. While greater specificity of the functions performed is likely necessary to achieve a truly normatively justified accountability system, this
Article seeks to serve as a starting point for such an analysis, leaving further nuances and discussion for another time.203
While this Article believes it exponentially preferable for domestic
governments to undertake a harmonization process similar to the one
described below in Part IV.B, where domestic governments do not utilize
procedures sufficiently similar to those described, international governance regimes must do so in order to properly certify NGO participation
and prevent favoritism to NGOs located in countries where such procedures are followed.

200. Keohane, Commentary on the Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental
Organizations, supra note 67, at 479.
201. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 18.
202. See generally Kaldor, supra note 34; Keohane & Nye, supra note 5.
203. See supra Table 1. One danger in the approach of applying function-based accountability controls at the micro-function level is someone must determine what controls
are appropriate for which functions. The greater the number of functions to which accountability controls are applied, the greater the power held by the individual(s) or entity
making such determinations. Therefore, it might be best to utilize a second-best approach
to function-based application of accountability controls, opting for categories of broadlydefined governance functions. As a preliminary view on this topic, this Article would see
the importance of such broad definition dependent upon whether an independent accreditation organization to perform such determinations similar in nature to the process described in Part IV.C.5 is available to perform such determinations and whether NGO
participation is intended to hold the governance regime accountable or whether the regime seeks to hold the NGO accountable, or both.
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1. Political Functions
As described above in Part III.A, NGOs have a very important role to
play in policy formulation. It has been claimed “[t]ransnational actors
who are not active participants in governance arrangements or negotiating systems [but merely lobby or perform advocacy functions] pose few
challenges to existing concepts and theories in political science and international relations.”204 Despite this claim, “policy-making accountability” is still very important in international governance.205 As mentioned
above, representation issues rightfully dominate the discussion concerning NGO accountability in performing political activities.206
Democratic accountability is important when NGOs perform political
functions because they are acting in a representative function. Authority
for NGO participation in policy formulation is often justified in terms of
intrinsic rights to political participation.207 Although not all political
functions are necessarily representative in nature, the overwhelming majority of NGOs involved in policy formulation claim to represent some
interest, providing them with the legitimacy sufficient to justify participatory rights.208 However, where such representation is crucial to achieve
this legitimacy, assurance must be made the NGOs are properly representative. This is important because if an NGO falsely claims to represent a group and is allowed to participate, the NGO may serve to delegitimize or otherwise thwart the true representation of the group.209 Although such representation need not be necessarily democratic in nature—especially since democracy is not a universally accepted form of

204. Börzel & Risse, supra note 82, at 198.
205. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Public Participation in Consolidating Democracies: Hungary and Poland, in BUILDING A TRUSTWORTHY STATE IN POST-SOCIALIST
TRANSITION 9 (János Kornai & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 2004). See generally SUSAN
ROSE-ACKERMAN, CONTROLLING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC LAW IN
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES (1995).
206. See Charnovitz, supra note 106, at 56.
207. See generally Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, supra note 111.
208. Michael Edwards, NGO Legitimacy—Voice or Vote ?, Feb. 2003, http://www.
globalpolicy.org/ngos/credib/2003/0202rep.htm. See also David H. Moore, Agency Costs
in International Human Rights, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 491, 503–04 (2004).
209. See generally Robert Charles Blitt, Who Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human
Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and the Case for Regulation, 10 BUFF. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 261 (2004); Edwards, supra note 208.
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governance—many international regimes do base their authority and participatory requirements upon some modicum of democratic legitimacy.210
The literature on democratic, or representational, accountability focuses on NGO representation of beneficiary interests, rather than upon
member interests.211 While this Article acknowledges external accountability to beneficiaries is important where NGOs claim to represent beneficiary interests, not all NGOs which provide services to beneficiary
groups or act altruistically on behalf of third-parties claim to speak on
behalf of those groups.212 Therefore, accountability controls related to the
performance of political functions should be determined primarily by
representation of the NGO’s internal membership. Representation of
beneficiary groups is necessary when an NGO claims to represent the
views of its beneficiaries; otherwise, representation requirements merely
serve to decrease the participatory opportunities of otherwise qualified
NGOs.213 As a result, under the democratic or representative model of
governance authority, representational, hierarchical, and fiscal accountability controls are important to constrain NGO behavior in the performance of political functions.214
Additionally, peer accountability mechanisms are fairly appropriate
under situations where NGOs perform what might be considered political
functions, since negotiated outcomes depend upon the willingness of participants to enter into a meaningful negotiation process.215 These functions are also most closely aligned with traditional state-state relations,
which operate based upon balance of power constraints and are most related to peer accountability constraints in accountability theory. This is
therefore relevant under theories considering “accountability as . . . responsiveness, obligation and willingness to communicate with others
across the various agencies (the various government departments, quasi210. While this Article conflates representative and democratic accountability for simplicity’s sake and to align it more squarely with the existing literature on democratic accountability, adequate representation of some form is crucial for most NGO participation
in policy formulation.
211. See generally Wapner, supra note 50; Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, supra note 111.
212. NGO Monitor, Different Types of NGOs, http://www.ngo-monitor.org/ngo/types.
htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2005).
213. See generally Blitt, supra note 209.
214. As noted above in Table 1, hierarchical controls are considered to include democratic or other representative accountability to members or beneficiaries (where explicitly
stated).
215. See Wapner, supra note 50, at 202 (discussing the effects of NGO cooperation
and coalitions on accountability).

186

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 31:1

governmental organizations and private contractors) constituting the
relevant policy community responsible for the ‘joined-up government’
of, and service delivery in, that sphere.”216 However, peer accountability
controls are only valid to the extent they identify failures to adequately
represent member or beneficiary interests, and when peer organizations
identifying such failures have the authority to present the regime with
such information.217 Since peer accountability controls are typically outcome-based, this type of control for the most part will be unacceptable to
resolve issues of effective representation.
From a regime perspective, then, NGO intentions should be the primary determinant of accountability controls which should be designed by
reference to the NGO’s structure and ability to uphold its intentions.
NGO intentions relate to the motives or purposes with which NGOs
act.218 NGOs representing or claiming to represent particular interests
must actually attempt to do so. Whether the NGO is able to fully represent the interests of its membership or beneficiary populations is another
matter, though it certainly should be an ultimate goal. However, representation need not be perfect in order to be legitimate.219 To determine an
organization’s representativeness, then, the actual level of representativeness should be gauged against the NGO’s stated intentions to determine the veracity of their claims.
2. Administrative Functions
While intentions dominate accountability controls of NGOs performing
political functions, actions (or competence) are most important for determining accountability of NGOs undertaking administrative functions.
The role of NGOs in performing administrative duties in international
216. Goodin, supra note 5, at 27 (quoting Mark Considine, The End of the Line? Accountable Governments in the Age of Networks, Partnerships and Joined-Up Services, 15
GOVERNANCE 21, 21 (2002)).
217. See Wapner, supra note 50, at 201.
218. Goodin, supra note 5, at 11.
219. A simple example from the United States political system demonstrates this: under the “two-party system,” the United States’ political system is divided into two major
groups based upon differing purposes of the two parties. It is axiomatic each member of
each party does not adhere to every tenet of his or her party of choice. Instead, members
align themselves with groups most closely resembling their own views or representing
the interests which are of greatest importance to the members. Indeed, absolute representation of each member’s views would preclude effective organization. As a matter of
pragmatism, therefore, imperfect representation must be sufficient to justify representation. The trickier question is determining when representation is not sufficiently representative of member or beneficiary interests or views.
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governance is one primarily of functionality for the organization. Generally, a high level of technocratic expertise is required for such activities,
and therefore, issues of representation are less significant.220 Instead, external accountability to the regime is most important from a regime perspective.
NGO authority to participate as administrative governance actors is derived from the privileges granted by the regime.221 NGOs and their represented memberships have no intrinsic rights to participate as administrative actors. Rather, their participation serves instrumental purposes for
the regime. As a result, NGO authority and legitimacy are derived from
and delegated by the regime and can therefore be proscribed and withdrawn by the regime.222 Adequate representation of members or beneficiary groups is therefore not a normative prerequisite to properly serving
as an administrative agent of an international regime (assuming authority
to perform such a function).
Supervisory and legal accountability controls, derived from the power
of delegation, are therefore the primary mechanisms used in ensuring
accountability. Secondary means of ensuring external accountability to
the regime are enforced through budgetary and other fiscal controls, hierarchical controls for managers in their individual capacities, and to a
certain extent, peer accountability controls where other NGOs are also
involved in the provision of particular administrative duties.223 Internal
accountability (necessary to ensure membership fees and other base
revenue and organizational sources of power are not mismanaged or
abused) to members is achieved not through representational accountability mechanisms, but through procedural controls to ensure fiscal
(through membership exit and loss of membership fees) and hierarchical
accountability.224
Action-related accountability concerns dominate administrative actions.225 NGO actions are evaluated to ensure they do not exceed the
scope of the mandate provided by the delegating authority.226 Outcomerelated concerns also exist, but are less significant in the performance of
administrative functions, since action-related accountability concerns
220. See generally Goodin, supra note 5, at 23–30 (suggesting homogeny is not necessary because the desire to acheive a negotiated outcome is enough to succeed).
221. Id. at 1.
222. Id. at 3.
223. Id. at 3–4.
224. Keohane, Political Accountability, supra note 5, at 15.
225. Keohane & Nye, supra note 5, at 27.
226. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 11.
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determine which qualified NGOs participate and require those NGOs to
perform their assigned duties. Therefore, if the NGO is to produce
documentation or training programs, outcome-oriented accountability
mechanisms provide little additional guidance, since NGO authority is
derivative and delegated and can be withdrawn if the NGO fails to meet
the quality expectations of the regime. Nevertheless, a minimal level of
outcome-related constraints should also be imposed to ensure NGOs
produce well-researched neutral information, for instance.
3. Enforcement Functions
Different from both political and administrative functions, NGOs’ performance as enforcers of the rules of an international regime is derived
both from intrinsic rights and instrumental privileges.227 NGO participatory rights may be delegated to NGOs by the international regime based
upon reasons of expertise or such rights may be intrinsic to ensure regime adherence to the rules established by the regime and its Member
States.228 As a result of this bifurcated source of authority, NGOs may be
held to account by multiple groups: the regime (including the regime’s
beneficiaries if the regime acts outside its scope of authority), the beneficiaries of the NGO, and, to a lesser extent, the internal membership of
the NGO.229
NGOs performing enforcement functions must maintain accountability
to the regime and its purposes to ensure the regime is held to account and
for the regime to ensure the NGOs act within the authority properly delegated to them, depending upon the particular enforcement function.
NGOs must also ensure accountability to the regime’s beneficiaries and
the beneficiaries of the NGO, whether internal or external. Generally,
however, external beneficiary interests will dominate, and therefore adequate representation of such interests must be assured.230 External accountability to beneficiaries, while predominantly achieved through the
regime’s policies and supervisory mandates, must also be ensured
through a modicum of hierarchical accountability to the beneficiaries
directly, where such enforcement functions directly affect them.
227. For a discussion of how these rights and privileges interact, see Erik B. Bluemel,
Separating Instrumental from Intrinsic Rights: Toward an Understanding of Indigenous
Participation in International Rule-Making (forthcoming 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. (Fall
2005)).
228. See Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, supra note 111, at 276–77; Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 8.
229. Charnovitz, supra note 111, at 277–78.
230. Id. at 278–79.
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While beneficiary accountability is primarily determined by intentions
and actions, external accountability to the regime is determined mostly
by reference to actions and performance outcomes, especially in the provision of services.231 Effectiveness, expertise, and experience are crucial
determinants for outcome-based accountability controls. For delegated
non-public service provision NGO functions, external accountability to
the regime generally is ensured through outcome-oriented supervisory,
legal, and fiscal controls.232 The basic internal accountability necessary
to ensure managerial compliance is achieved through fiscal and hierarchical requirements established (in the framework of this Article) under
domestic law, as will be discussed in the next section.
B. Harmonizing Domestic Procedures
National governments often have processes by which NGOs are established and verified under domestic law. Recognizing this, it would be
inefficient to require international governance regimes to duplicate domestic requirements. Implicit legitimacy is often established through
domestic government recognition of NGOs as legal entities.233 This legitimacy, however, should not be taken for granted, since the international regime may have interests which are not purely based upon the
aggregation of interests of its member States.234 As a result, international
regimes must validate the rigor with which the national governments apply their accreditation procedures, much as the NACEC evaluates the
enforcement of national environmental laws under NAFTA, and apply
more stringent requirements where necessary and appropriate.235 As a
result, domestic procedures should be viewed as baseline requirements
for participation in international governance, but should be appended
with international requirements where necessary to ensure accountability
appropriate to the governance function involved.
The view of this Article is efficiency requires domestic governments to
certify NGOs as legitimate actors with the international system focusing
on legitimizing NGO involvement in particular international governance
functions. However, where domestic governments do not have procedures or an effective process of legitimizing NGOs, the international sys231. See generally Charnovitz, supra note 106 (discussing examples of NGOs, issues
arising from their involvment, and their functions).
232. See generally Grant & Keohane, supra note 4.
233. See Ann M. Florini, Lessons Learned, in THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY 211, 233 (Ann M. Florini ed., 2000).
234. See Aman, supra note 39, at 1705.
235. Id. at 1712–14.
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tem must do so to prevent unfairness between countries’ NGOs. This
Article considers it highly desirable to harmonize the domestic NGO legitimizing processes to both improve the effectiveness of the process
itself and to conserve resources. This Article also considers domestic
governments far superior in the basic legitimizing process given their
proximity to the NGOs and their (typically) preexisting information collection processes. Domestic governments are also most capable of understanding the variety of local organizational structures and purposes and
therefore should play a central role in certifying NGOs as eligible for
participation in international governance.
However, establishing domestic accountability mechanisms for NGOs
is no easy task considering the great variety in NGO organizational
forms:
[T]here are wide difference [sic] among NGOs concerning their forms
of organisation—formal versus informal, hierarchy versus participation, networks versus federations, centralised versus decentralisation,
not to mention differences in organisational culture. Some NGOs are
membership organisations; others are governed by boards or trustees.
Moreover, the meaning of membership varies.236

Nevertheless, most national governments have, and continue to establish,
requirements NGOs must meet to earn a particular, usually special, legal
status.237 Of particular difficulty is the issue of distinguishing between
local and international NGOs and determining what role national governments might play in certifying such organizations.238 There are over
200,000 local NGOs in the developing world alone.239 In addition, there
are approximately 29,000 international NGOs.240 International NGOs
often seek beneficiary legitimacy by allying with local NGOs and are

236. Kaldor, supra note 34, at 24.
237. Requiring national governments to impose some requirements on NGOs prior to
allowing their participation in international governance is not new to this Article, as the
UN defines NGOs as non-profit organizations, implying those NGOs are established
under some domestic legal structure as non-profit entities. See supra text accompanying
note 2.
238. Tavis, supra note 122, at 510.
239. See JULIE FISHER, NONGOVERNMENTS: NGOS AND THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
OF THE THIRD WORLD 6 (1998).
240. NGOs with operations in more than three countries are generally considered “international NGOs.” COMM’N ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD:
THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 32 (1995); NGOs: Sins of the
Secular Missionaries, supra note 147, at 25 (referring to the Commission on Global Governance’s report).
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frequent sources of funds for their local partners.241 Thus, while international NGOs may have greater legitimacy as actors at the international
governance level, domestic NGOs have a significant role to play as well.
Limiting participation to international NGOs may seriously undermine
the funding and effectiveness of domestic NGOs, ultimately to the detriment of local beneficiaries.242 Additionally, many, if not all, of the governance functions described above in Part III could be performed by local NGOs having the proper level of competence to perform such functions. Therefore, this Article does not discount the participation of local
NGOs in international governance as do the ECOSOC procedures.243
However, this Article does recognize the difficulty in relying upon domestic governments to certify international NGOs as potential participants in international governance.244 This Article favors (though by no
means requires) an alliance between international NGOs and local NGOs
to alleviate the disadvantages of limiting participation to either local or
international NGOs, especially where beneficiary interests are represented and experience or expertise are important (as in the provision of
services).
In countries certifying NGOs, domestic accountability requirements
generally require NGOs: (1) serve disempowered or underserved populations; (2) are established to promote the public interest; (3) are fiscally
responsible so monies do not inure to private individuals; and (4) have an
organizational structure holding its managers and directors accountable
to its membership through some means.245 These basic requirements cre241. See Tavis, supra note 122, at 510; Tarlock, supra note 82, at 65–66.
242. For a discussion of the interaction between international and domestic NGOs, see
Shelley Inglis, Re/Constructing Right(s): The Dayton Peace Agreement, International
Civil Society Development, and Gender in Postwar Bosnia-Herzegovina, 30 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 107–13 (1998).
243. See ECOSOC Procedures, supra note 179.
244. See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of how this difficulty might be resolved.
245. In the United States, Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) provides the test for organizations not organized for profit, but operated solely for the advancement of social
welfare. Of course, for-profit entities can still perform services and other international
governance functions. This Article, however, is intended as a direct response to the
wealth of literature on NGO accountability.
Although this Article only analyzes NGO accountability, its analysis may be portable to other actors performing similar functions for the reasons described above. This
Article does not believe NGOs should have a right to participate while other for-profit
associations do not. However, the latter may require different accountability controls, an
issue not directly addressed by this Article. See Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance, supra note 111, at 276; Peel supra note 176,
at 73–74; see also supra notes 53, 65. While it is possible different concerns exist regard-
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ate a good base for establishing mechanisms to hold NGOs internally
accountable when performing functions associated with international
governance. However, “the absence of standard public law safeguards
concentrates significant power in NGO secretariats” and may encourage
forum shopping or a race-to-the-bottom in NGO domestic regulation.246
Therefore, the following sections call for harmonization of domestic
regulation of NGOs to ensure a minimum level of accountability. This
minimum level of accountability is based upon the process of legitimizing NGOs as valid actors in any sphere of governance and includes the
four accountability controls discussed above.
1. Representation
While domestic regimes generally require NGO service-orientation
toward underserved or disempowered populations, this requirement is to
ensure the NGO operates for a “public purpose,” rather than representation of beneficiary interests. Representation controls in this context
should ensure members have some hold over policy decisions or agency
leadership, such as occurs in a principal-agent relationship.247 Therefore,
for harmonization purposes, accountability mechanisms should ensure
only representation of member interests. External accountability to beneficiaries is not necessary for all governance functions. Therefore, analysis of accountability to beneficiaries, while best done at the domestic
level, should not be a requirement harmonized prior to participation, but
should be evaluated (by the domestic government) based upon the particular function the NGO seeks to perform.
One criticism to this approach is rules governing NGO interactions
with local communities can have significant positive consequences on

ing NGOs as compared to other actors, counseling for different or fewer accountability
controls, this Article suggests these concerns may be neither rational nor supportable
distinctions when NGOs perform governance functions capable of being performed by
other entities (even if not equally well). In fact, “it is important for global institutions,
international institutions and governments, not to privilege NGOs in debates about social
justice.” Kaldor, supra note 34, at 27.
Additionally, some have suggested government agencies do not have the same
“ethos of mutuality” as NGOs (though officials would) and therefore should not be full
participants in network governance structures. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 43–44. Of
course, interest polarization may occur with or without government involvement and is
usually a more likely outcome than cooperation-based approaches in international governance. See Brown et al., supra note 60, at 28–32.
246. See Brown et al., supra note 60, at 23–32.
247. See Keohane, Political Accountability, supra note 5, at 8.
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NGO relations with its beneficiaries.248 As NGO memberships are not
usually comprised of NGO beneficiaries, it is important to differentiate
NGO representativeness from NGO adherence to its intended beneficent
goals as well as from representativeness of beneficiary views/desires, all
of which may differ significantly. The disjuncture between the views and
interests of intended beneficiaries and members can significantly impede
the effectiveness of NGOs. While this is a sound criticism, it is valid
only in relation to the organization’s purpose, claims to representativeness, or situations where NGO effectiveness can be decreased by the
membership/beneficiary disjuncture. Therefore, it shall be discussed
along with other NGO purposes below in Part IV.B.3.
Although traditionally considered in the context of democratic accountability akin to states, NGOs need not be highly representative of
beneficiary interests to perform governance actions.249 Some have argued
outcome-based measures should be more important than the representativeness of the NGO.250 However, this Article does not believe such generalizations are appropriate, and argues different accountability measures
must be evaluated in light of the function the NGO seeks to perform, as
discussed in greater detail in Part IV.A.
While the requirement NGOs be non-profit entities helps ensure actions in the “public interest” to a certain extent, it has been recognized
that NGOs still operate under a profit motive, despite being non-profit,
and therefore may not be entirely representative of member views.251 It is
improper to assume NGOs are no more than a mere aggregation of their
memberships’ interests. Rather, bureaucratic theory suggests NGOs may

248. Craig Johnson, Toward Accountability: Narrowing the Gap Between NGO Priorities and Local Realities in Thailand 5 (Overseas Dev. Inst., Working Paper No. 149,
2001) (arguing internal accountability mechanisms are stronger than many scholars acknowledge).
249. Wapner, supra note 50, at 199; see also Tarlock, supra note 82, at 75.
250. See Delbrück, supra note 106, at 41–42 (recognizing “providing a stringent legal
framework . . . that NGOs would have to abide by in order to be admitted as participants
in the international system could enhance their legitimacy”).
251. See Bjørn Møller, “Civil Society Romanticism”: A Sceptical [sic] View: Reflections on Håkan Thörn’s Solidarity Across Borders (unpublished paper), available at
http://www.ihis.aau.dk/~bm/NGOs-SA.doc (last visited Aug. 19, 2005). While this Article considers NGO actors distinct from other potential civil society and economic actors
in global governance, a regime may not consider such a distinction important, or, as a
second-best alternative, verifying the “public interest” nature of the organization might
prove exceedingly difficult. See Peel, supra note 176, at 73–74. In such a case, however,
the regime would still need to filter out organizations with improper or falsified purposes,
making this analysis mostly pertinent, though with a slightly different focus.
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have public-interest values not derived from any interest-aggregation
theory of representation.252 As a result, adequate member representation
must be viewed in part in terms of process, and not wholly in terms of
results, and must ensure the results are not contrary to the purpose of the
NGO.
Representativeness is difficult to verify,253 but local variations demand
it be addressed at the local or national level as opposed to the international level. Three indicators, however, may be a useful starting point in
determining NGO representativeness: “the institutional ability of [members] to sanction leaders, the de facto capacity of [members] to sanction
leaders, and the [organization’s] responsiveness to the expressed will of
the [members].”254
2. Accountability
At the international level, accountability of NGOs generally focuses on
analyzing the democratic accountability of NGOs.255 However, other accountability issues exist and are the dominant forms of control imposed
at the domestic level. Because NGO self management and internal accountability procedures are insufficient to guarantee NGO accountability,256 various mechanisms to improve internal NGO management have
been proposed.257 Therefore, despite the fact NGOs can be held accountable to their members through member exit, financial conditionality re-

252. Id. at 5–6.
253. Brown et al., supra note 60, at 25. The actual representativeness of NGOs has also
been questioned recently. See ROBERT O’BRIEN ET AL., CONTESTING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVE-MENTS 200–
01 (2000); Martin Wolf, What the World Needs from the Multilateral Trading System, in
THE ROLE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 183, 197–98
(Gary P. Samson ed., 2001).
254. See Brown et al., supra note 60, at 24–27.
255. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 4, at 13.
256. See generally LEWIS, supra note 44. See also ALAN FOWLER, STRIKING A
BALANCE: A GUIDE TO ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL
ORGANISATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1997); Helmut K. Anheier, Managing
Non-Profit Organizations: Toward a New Approach (Center for Civil Society, Civil Society Working Paper No. 1, 2000), available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/
publications/cswp/civil_society_wp.htm.
257. See MICHAEL EDWARDS, NGO RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: A NEW DEAL FOR
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 28–37 (2000) (noting a vote alone is no substitute for a voice, and
suggesting independent regulation by an external agency, for example, as a means to
improve NGO accountability).
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quirements, advisory boards,258 and other externally-imposed accountability requirements are often deemed desirable from a national policy
perspective.
Specifically, financial accountability controls are used to ensure fiscal
responsibility of the organization so self-serving “for-profit” personal
motives do not exist.259 Hierarchical accountability controls are used to
further constrain NGO managers and employees from inappropriate actions and rent-seeking behavior. For this reason, the method of board
selection is important to NGO accountability.260 Both fiscal and hierarchical controls are more readily obtained and verified at the national
level as opposed to the international level. Therefore, requiring controls
at the national level in the first instance may make economic sense.
3. Validity of Proffered Goals
Another issue best harmonized at the domestic level is the requirement
that NGOs serve the “public interest.” Definitions regarding the “public
interest” will certainly vary by state. In fact, not all States define NGOs
as non-profit entities.261 Since “moral accountability arises from the mission of the civil society actor,”262 it is important to ensure the legitimacy
derived from an organization’s NGO status is justified. The requirement
NGOs be non-profit entities serves in part to ensure NGOs serve, or in
some cases represent, marginalized interests imperfectly serviced or represented by the State. In this sense, some NGOs serve a “second-best”

258. Wapner, supra note 50, at 201–02 (“Many professional institutions use outside
experts or boards of directors that watch out for the organization’s long-term well-being.
These boards are usually comprised of people who are uninvolved in day-to-day operations and therefore possess a broader perspective on the issue area and the organization’s
political role. Boards can have authority to depose NGO leaders and shape the broad
outlines of campaign work. While board members implicitly share the overall normative
orientation of the organization and its officials, they come to the group as outsiders. In
fact, they are invited onto the board precisely because they have some distance from the
organization.”).
259. See Brown et al., supra note 60, at 24–27.
260. See Country Plan Presentations: The Philippine Group, in CSRO ACCOUNTABILITY & SUSTAINABILITY: CRITICAL LESSONS FROM BEST PRACTICES 73–74 (SE Asia
Reg’l Conf., Feb. 18–20, 2002), available at http://www.synergos.org/globalphilanthropy/02/csroproceedings.pdf [hereinafter CSRO ACCOUNTABILITY].
261. See, e.g., Felicidad Soledad, Accountability as a Sector: The PCNC Experience,
in CSRO ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 260, at 9 (noting the Philippines did not certify
NGOs for tax deduction purposes until recently).
262. Kaldor, supra note 34, at 21.
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function of representation or service-provision.263 However, the legitimacy of distinguishing between NGOs serving underserved populations
and NGOs serving more politically powerful associations is normatively
suspect. Failure to limit the participation of these more powerful NGOs,
however, means increasing NGO participation generally may in fact further disempower underrepresented groups as they must then battle
against potential capture of organizations by more powerful NGOs.264
As a result, it is important to link the international regime’s goals of
NGO participation to the purpose with which the NGO is formulated.
The purpose of the NGO is important not only to determine which NGOs
are actually serving the public interest but also to ensure NGO institutional competence in particular fields.265 Relationships with marginalized
populations on specific issues creates a measure of competence important to proper international governance. Although one society may be
comprised of marginalized populations which are politically powerful in
other societies, this variation does not overcome the significant need to
establish a harmonized approach to tackling the issue of NGO purpose to
determine whether organizations act for the public-interest or private
profit.266
4. Veracity of Proffered Goals
Harmonizing domestic requirements for initial NGO certification is insufficient, however, to ensure NGOs are appropriately accountable and
formulated at the domestic level. Without a requirement NGOs be evaluated for the veracity of their goals and the imposition of other accountability controls, it will be difficult to weed out NGOs which serve as
mere fronts for states seeking increased political power or organizations
misrepresenting their purposes or engaging in other fraudulent rentseeking behavior.
263. See Ngaire Woods, Good Governance in International Organizations, GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE, Jan.–Mar. 1999, at 39, 45.
264. See Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in POWER AND GOVERNANCE IN A
PARTIALLY GLOBALIZED WORLD 219, 236, 239 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 2002); Kahler,
supra note 5, at 14 (citing Bernard Manin et al., Introduction, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION (Adam Przeworski et al. eds., 1999)); Woods, supra note
263.
265. Goodin, supra note 5, at 25. This, of course, assumes application of the UN’s
definition of NGO. See supra note 2.
266. This is not to say that industry or for-profit associations have no right to participate in international governance. However, this Article is limited to an analysis of NGOs,
as defined by the UN.
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It has been argued, relative to other actors, intentions play a much
greater role in ensuring accountability of the non-profit sector and regimes should continue to focus on the intentions of NGO actors, monitoring NGO intentions undertaken through peer accountability mechanisms.267 Despite these claims for the greater use of peer accountability
in holding NGOs to account to their purposes,268 fly-by-night NGOs have
not been successfully regulated through internal codes of conduct or peer
accountability controls.269
Instead, requirements at the national level help validate NGO actions
against the purposes with which they are established and are therefore
important to ensure long-term NGO accountability and public-interest
oriented behavior. As noted above, NGOs in international governance
often do not disclose or are not required to disclose their funding
sources.270 International validation of domestic data is therefore necessary to ensure the veracity of the data collected and NGOs are not merely
State funded or controlled organizations. The continued requirement of
financial accountability is also important to ensure the organization does
not engage in for-profit activities. However, determining whether an
NGO has faithfully adhered to its mission and vision can be a difficult
task.271

267. See generally Goodin, supra note 5; Grant & Keohane, supra note 4.
268. Goodin, supra note 5, at 26.
269. See Soledad, supra note 261, at 9.
270. Maura Blue Jeffords, Turning the Protestor into a Partner for Development: The
Need for Effective Consultation between the WTO and NGOs, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 937,
982 (2003).
271. See, e.g., Abdi Suryaningati, The YAPPIKA Experience, in CSRO ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 260, at 12. This Article does not necessarily advocate the use of effectiveness measurements as means to determine the adherence to an organizational mission and vision, both for normative reasons and because of the difficulty of attributing
outcomes with NGO actions. See id.; Eugenio M. Caccam, Jr., Measuring Results and
Impact, in CSRO ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 260, at 14. Nevertheless, it recognizes
such outcome-based measurements may be useful, and therefore applies the three subjects of accountability described by Goodin (intentions, actions, results) to NGO participation in international governance. See Goodin, supra note 5, at 10–11 (noting although
the three subjects are not necessarily exhaustive, they do relate to the three main ethical
forms of virtue: ethics, deontology, and consequentialism). Although “[n]o non-profit is
sensitive only to intentions and wholly unsensitive to results,” for participation purposes,
it is not clear a results-orientation is appropriate, since a consideration of results may
occur when seeking funding, as donors look both at qualitative and quantitative financial
accountability. See id. at 16, 25 n.32; Nipa Banerjee, Donor Sharing, in CSRO
ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 260, at 65; Brown et al., supra note 60, at 16–17.
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Often, formal means are lacking to ensure organizations are meeting
their stated objectives.272 This issue may also be exacerbated by financial
conditionality, which may not perfectly align with stated objectives and
goals.273 In fact, issues of multiple accountability often make coherent
management difficult.274 Establishing accreditation procedures at the international governance level may serve to streamline multiple accountability concerns into a single accountability source. This may occur as
donors adopt the accreditation procedures used by international regimes,
thereby minimizing conflicting accountability concerns and loyalties significantly. While loyalty issues surrounding financing will likely inevitably occur given donor financing preferences, accreditation procedures
may be used to ensure only those organizations with goals appropriately
aligned with such donor preferences will be financed, rather than allowing NGOs to constantly redefine their priorities to meet donor demands.
One concern with such an arrangement, however, is donor financing
may be given even greater power under such an arrangement. Only those
NGOs whose goals are aligned with donor preferences will receive funding for participation in international governance activities.275 NGOs
which could normally receive financing upon a redefinition of their goals
may be left without funds, causing some populations or issues to go unserved. Whereas these NGOs might have been able to incorporate some
of their preferences into a donor-driven project previously and at least to
some extent servicing those populations or issues, now those NGOs
would be precluded from doing so in the international governance context. Although not precluded from doing so in an informal, nongovernance context, international donors may adopt the accreditation
procedures of international regimes throughout all of their financing arrangements, thereby running the risk such a policy might result in sub272. See Johnson, supra note 248.
273. See id. at 5.
274. See id. See also EDWARDS & HULME, supra note 147; David Stark, Ambiguous
Assets for Uncertain Environments: Heterarchy in Postsocialist Firms, in THE TWENTYFIRST-CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 69, 101 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001) (“To be accountable to many different principles becomes a means to be accountable to none.”); Goodin, supra note 5, at 6–8 (noting generally different accountability mechanisms operating upon NGO actions); Keohane & Nye, supra note 5; E.A. Brett, Voluntary Agencies as Development Organizations: Theorizing the Problem of Efficiency and Accountability, 24 DEV. & CHANGE 269
(1993).
275. This is not far from what happens currently, as there “has been a proliferation of
NGOs that are organized more to take advantage of [donor] resources than to accomplish
their nominally value-based missions.” Brown et al., supra note 60, at 12.
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optimal financing of various populations’ needs. The danger accreditation procedures will limit the servicing of various issues, however, seems
overstated, as many NGOs pursue multiple objectives simultaneously
and even under very strict donor financing arrangements and still find
means to adapt the donor requirements to meet the needs of both the
NGO and the intended beneficiaries.276
In the end, for NGOs to be held accountable in a coherent and consistent manner at the international governance level, some harmonization in
definition and regulation at the national level is required. NGOs have a
sense of moral legitimacy due to their focus on public interest or nonprofit issues. It is therefore important for national governments to ensure
an organization seeking NGO certification meet some requirements to be
labeled a non-profit organization, including purpose- and populationbased requirements, financial and hierarchical accountability controls,
and controls ensuring alignment between the purposes and actions of the
organization. These mechanisms together establish the minimum requirements necessary to create some coherency to NGOs in the international sphere, thereby reducing the costs and improving the correctness
of international governance systems’ certification of NGO participants.
C. Implementation Issues
This is a theory-based Article, leaving most of the details of implementation to further study. However, some general implementation concerns
should be noted.
1. Cost
The ability to implement a unified system of NGO certification unique
to each regime’s mandates and purposes will inevitably impose a number
of significant costs. While some of these costs may be minimized
through economies of scale if performed by a single certification organization,277 they will nevertheless be significant for international regimes.
These costs may be borne by applicant NGOs, depending upon the regime mandate, making distributional inequities a danger. Despite this
potential pitfall, these concerns do not appear particularly worrisome
since significant funding is available from various organizations to support NGO capacity-building and participation in international govern276. See Johnson, supra note 248, at 14–15 (noting such flexibility is enhanced by
requirements seeking greater incorporation of intended beneficiaries in the decisionmaking processes but some ambiguity is still necessary to allow such flexibility).
277. See infra Part IV.C.5 for a discussion of this type of arrangement.
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ance.278 Additionally, this Article seeks to place some of the costs of implementing this framework upon national governments, which typically
have greater resources for certification than international regimes.279
2. Feasibility
a. Regime Perspective
From a regime perspective, implementing the framework laid out
might not only impose costs, but might be difficult to achieve even absent financial constraints. Lack of adequate data or resources to verify
the veracity of organizations may present significant challenges in implementation. Recognition of these problems is the primary reason why
this Article suggests a two-tiered approach to certification: domestic- and
international-level procedures. However, despite these data gaps, it is
important to provide the indicators by which future studies may be conducted and to identify areas of further research.
Additionally, international regimes may not be particularly competent
in certifying NGOs to participate, as most have not undertaken such certification requirements. As a result, a significant learning curve and proceduralization of the certification process will be required to guide regime behavior. While a dedicated, independent certification agency may
significantly assist regimes in this process,280 this learning curve will
nevertheless exist and may present significant short-term equity and justice concerns.
Finally, significant concerns exist regarding the ability of international
organizations to pierce through domestic regulations serving as mere
window dressing. This Article assumes such a process is possible, as it
has faith in the approach undertaken by NACEC in the NAFTA regime.
278. For example, the United Nations Development Programme and Global Environment Facility Small Grants Programme provides up to $50,000 for NGOs seeking to
build their capacity in international governance as it relates to environmental protection.
See The Global Environment Facility Small Grants Programme 1992–2002, Hands-on
Actions for Sustainable Development (2002), http://sgp.undp.org/download/SGP10)
yearReport.pdf.
279. Cf. Peel, supra note 176, at 74 (“Greater institutional constraints in the international setting may mean that tribunals do not have the resources to devote to screening
individual applications and submissions by NGOs. However, such considerations do not
dictate the exclusion of NGOs from the international environmental dispute resolution
processes altogether. Rather, they suggest the need for development of a process of accrediting NGOs in the international environmental arena to ensure an empirical basis for
determining their claimed representativeness and expertise.”).
280. See infra Part IV.C.5.
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This Article counsels for freedom of information laws to the extent they
provide information regarding government funding and NGO purposes,
structures, and funding sources. Nevertheless, the difficulty of determining whether an organization is a mere political arm of a state where such
laws do not exist will be immense, and without greater standardization,
including the use of standard accounting procedures, data gathered from
national governments or independently may require significant analysis
to decipher their importance.
b. NGO Perspective
From the NGO perspective, the requirements imposed by this Article
will likely undermine organizational efficiency to a certain extent. While
this Article does not advocate significantly different accountability
mechanisms than current literature, it does call for particular arrangements of accountability mechanisms, the strength of which may vary depending upon the functions performed (or the type of organization performing them). As a result, certain combinations of accountability
mechanisms may prove to be more stringent and hinder organizational
efficiency to a greater extent than existing requirements or theories. As a
result, such requirements might limit the number of NGOs capable of
performing governance activities to the larger NGOs capable of absorbing such additional costs.281 In the view of this Article, these concerns do
not seem particularly compelling as an argument to reject a functionbased approach to accountability, but certainly must be considered in
determining the strengths of accountability mechanisms applied to particular governance functions.
3. Western Bias
A significant concern for this framework is its potential to favor Western forms of organization. While the departure from democratic accountability theory opens the door for participation by non-Western NGOs
possibly left out of other accountability theories, the certification process
established by this Article’s framework nevertheless may create a potential bias against non-Western organizational forms which are not established according to the typically Western corporate model. Additionally,
this Article continues to rely on representation as being a normative basis
281. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 64, at 16, 20 (noting worries “the costs of compliance
will detract from the partners’ ability to carry out their project, an issue of special concern
to small-scale partnerships and developing country partnerships,” but arguing “innovative
policy tools can avoid this danger”).
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for internal, and to some extent, external accountability to beneficiaries.
While less concerning than mainstream accountability theory, which
primarily relies upon democratic representation models and elections,
this Article’s reliance on representation might be seen to imply a democratic model—an issue of concern since only approximately sixty percent
of global society is democratically governed through elections.282 However, this analysis does not assume such a requirement unless one is established at the regime level.
As noted in the previous section, the certification requirements imposed by this framework might also favor wealthier NGOs, typically
from Western or Northern countries.283 Even more disconcerting to some
might be the departure from typical accountability critiques of NGOs,
which disclaim NGOs’ failure to adequately represent their beneficiaries’
interests. Focus on internal accountability as accountability to members,
who are typically wealthy Northern individuals and organizations, might
advantage Northern policies. Southern countries may therefore oppose
general increases in NGO power,284 out of fear Northern NGOs’ policy
goals will not sync with local developing country realities, and may be
coterminous with Northern governments’ policy platforms.285 Additionally, Southern countries may fear allowing NGO participation will favor
Northern NGOs due to inequities in power, access to technology and resources, and the predominance of the English language in international
282. See Adrian Karatnycky, The 2000–2001 Freedom House Survey of Freedom, in
FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 2000–2001, at 9 (Linda Stern ed., 2001).
283. See CONSTRUCTING WORLD CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875 (John Boli & George M. Thomas eds., 1999).
284. See Daniel C. Esty, Linkages and Governance: NGOs at the World Trade Organization, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 709, 725 (1998) (“Other observers argue that a greater
role for NGOs at the WTO might exacerbate the existing bias toward Northern viewpoints and further weaken the voice of those advancing the needs of the developing
world.”); Philip M. Nichols, Participation of Nongovernmental Parties in the World
Trade Organization: Extension of Standing in World Trade Organization Disputes to
Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 295, 318–19 (1996) (explaining the
inequity that exists in advocating in an international forum because of the benefits to
well-monied interest groups).
285. See Rona Nardone, Like Oil and Water: The WTO and the World’s Water Resources, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 183, 194 (2003) (noting that Northern NGOs prioritize
natural resource and biological diversity protections, while Southern NGOs prioritize
human development); Maki Tanaka, Bridging the Gap Between Northern NGOs and
Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute Settlements in the WTO Under the Rio Principles, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 113, 120–21
(2003).
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governance.286 This fear, however, is not particularly significant, as the
theoretical framework established by the Article would actually reduce
the number of Northern NGOs claiming to represent Southern beneficiary interests where such beneficiaries are not properly represented in
NGO policymaking,287 spurring the formation of Southern NGOs or
Northern NGOs truly representative of Southern interests. Additionally,
this Article posits it is the responsibility of the regime itself to ensure full
and fair representation of all affected interests, so failure to ensure fairness in representation would be a shortfall of the regime, not of the
NGOs.
Finally, the certification requirements established under this Article run
the risk of privileging particular organizational forms. Requiring NGOs
to conform to a particular organizational structure, while perhaps making
them more easily verified and held to account, risks undermining cultural
forms of organization and hierarchy, as well as the overall effectiveness
of various organizations.288 Internal accountability structures vary significantly by culture and must be weighed against local custom. International regimes seeking to validate domestic non-profit legal structures
should not demand particular organizational forms, but should evaluate
the appropriateness of domestic legal non-profit structures against the
reasoning used by domestic governments. Therefore, while harmonization of domestic procedures is important in this context, it is also important to allow for local variation.289 In applying context-dependent accountability controls, therefore, formalism can be the enemy of the
good.290
One major obstacle is the requirement that NGOs be non-profit, which
may require some states to redefine their tax codes, thereby contravening
the will of the populace. Since the UN requires participating NGOs to be
non-profit, this Article assumes this issue has not presented significant
distributional equity problems, though it recognizes such concerns can
286. Riva Krut, Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence in International Decision-making 18–22 (United Nations Research Inst. for Soc. Dev., Discussion Paper No.
83, 1997), available at http://www.unrisd.org (follow “site search” hyperlink; then search
“Riva Krut”; then follow hyperlink to article).
287. This is the case because international NGOs can claim any beneficiary constituency and act on their behalf without accountability to the beneficiaries. This Article suggests a modification to this approach under certain circumstances, thereby either mandating greater direct representation of beneficiary interests or limiting NGO participation to
those organizations sufficiently representative of beneficiary interests.
288. See Kingsbury, supra note 6, at 188–93.
289. See id.
290. See id. at 189.
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exist and should be dealt with on a case-by-case basis to ensure fair
treatment across national borders.
4. Moral Hazard
There is potential concern the proceduralization of NGO participation
in international governance might create a presumption of NGO accountability. This presumption, in turn, might lead some actors to give more
credence to NGO positions than to other governance actors, such as
states or other less procedurally governed entities. This concern is especially acute in enforcement situations where NGOs hold international
governance regimes accountable. These NGOs might be less inclined to
evaluate the regimes’ performance (in holding the regime accountable) if
NGOs are participating in the structure, even when the NGO is not acting
as an accountability control to unwieldy regime power. This is a potential
concern, but one easily avoided through clear and simple certification
procedures which outline the exact reasons and functions the NGO is
allowed to perform.
Another moral hazard concern might present itself with respect to domestic certification requirements, whereby international regimes might
presume domestically certified NGOs are proper participants in international governance and therefore over-include NGOs in the governance
regime. These dangers, however, appear to be insignificant where proceduralization is designed to ensure greater accountability. Although formalization may increase legitimacy without increasing accountability,
the system proposed by this Article is intended to ensure accountability
and thereby avoid this problem.
5. Regime Accountability
Finally, significant concerns exist regarding overall regime accountability. Allowing the international regime to hold the NGO accountable
or require particular mechanisms places strong power in the hands of the
regime to dispel criticism by not accrediting NGOs with views critical of
the regime. As has been noted before, real power is held by those who
accredit the participating NGOs.291 Some have taken the position greater
inclusion is better, and therefore providing certification power to international regimes might increase their ability to restrict NGO participation
to only weak or already co-opted organizations: “[i]f NGOs are to be
held accountable to intergovernmental organizations, controlled ulti-

291. See Charnovitz, supra note 111.
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mately by governments, their most outstanding virtue—independence
from governmental authority—would be threatened.”292 However, I do
not share the conclusion this danger is so large as to warrant the application of external accountability only through peer and reputational accountability mechanisms.293
While many NGOs do act through NGO networks, this is an issue
separate from governance; peer accountability mechanisms are subject to
failure through collusion, and normatively, NGOs not involved in governance have no or limited normative right to hold other NGOs accountable.294 Additionally, reputational mechanisms, highly dependent upon
the provision of perfect information, are likely to be more effective in
ensuring internal NGO accountability to members than external accountability to beneficiaries, who are in a dependent situation. That is, donors
may cease or reduce their donations to organizations, but so long as the
organizations still have funding, it is likely the assistance such organizations seek to provide will not be significantly rejected by beneficiaries.
In the governance context, however, this is a non-issue, since NGOs
would be authorized to act under a contract to provide services on behalf
of the regime, so controls other than reputational mechanisms would be
applicable to hold NGOs accountable to beneficiaries under such circumstances. In a governance setting, NGOs are not necessarily weak actors
and therefore accountability controls previously asserted as sufficient in
the private NGO context are no longer so.295
As a result of this Article’s reluctance to rely upon peer accountability
controls, the framework proposed suggests the international regime be
involved in ensuring NGO accountability to the regime. These concerns
are significant in the context of holding the regime to account for its actions, but less so where the NGO is performing governance functions on
behalf of the regime. Nevertheless, the concern of cooptation, although
not significantly increased by this Article’s framework over the status
quo method of including NGOs, does counsel for the creation of an independent accreditation organization. This reviewing body would be based
upon a pool of actors and should include, at a minimum, one standing,
292. Keohane, Commentary on the Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental
Organizations, supra note 67, at 478.
293. See id.
294. See Tanaka, supra note 285, at 120–35.
295. See Keohane, Commentary on the Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental Organizations, supra note 67, at 479 (“[S]ince NGOs are themselves relatively
weak, their external accountability deficits are not as severe as the accountability deficits
for other organizations in world politics.”).
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independent member of the accreditation organization, one member of
the international regime to which the NGO applied for participation in its
governance activities, and an official from the country where the NGO’s
headquarters or field office is located, whichever is most pertinent to the
particular issue and international organizational mission. This reviewing
body should dispel most of the concerns associated with NGO cooptation
and regime rent-seeking behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed accountability theories related to NGO involvement in international governance and found such theories lack precision and clarity and have proven to be overly general. NGOs may perform two major roles in governance: serving to act as accountability
checks on international governance regimes or performing governance
functions on behalf of those regimes. This Article focused primarily on
the latter of the two roles, describing in detail in Part III some of the varied functions NGOs have performed in international governance regimes.
Deconstructing NGO participation in international governance reveals
different accountability concerns are raised by the different functions
performed by NGOs. As a result, accountability theory must recognize
these differences and seek to apply controls based on the particular functions performed by NGOs. Part IV provides a starting point for such a
function-based accountability theory. While a function-based framework
may present some significant implementation challenges for international
and domestic regimes, from both a normative and efficiency perspective,
such an approach is highly desirable because it avoids over- and underinclusion of NGOs in governance and ensures greater competition between NGOs for the performance of particular functions, allowing international regimes to select the NGO best fit to perform the particular
function. These implementation challenges warrant further study to detail
the contours of a function-based accountability theory and to illustrate
methods of determining the optimal balance between organizational and
institutional costs and ensuring suitable levels of accountability to the
appropriate individuals or entities.

